Buddhism and the Ethics of Nature——Some Remarks by Schmithausen Lambert




1. This article is the slightly revised version of a paper presented at Waseda 
University in January 1999. I had no intention of publishing it, but for cer­
tain reasons publication has become inevitable. Being fully aware o f the ten­
tative and provisional character of some parts of the paper even in its revised 
form, but not being in a position to further improve it at present, I can only 
hope that it may, as it stands, still have some clarifying and stimulating 
effect.1
2. I have borrowed the concept “ethics o f  nature” from the work of the 
German philosopher Angelika Krebs.2 Following Passmore, she defines 
nature as
1 I take this opportunity to thank all discussants—at Waseda University as well as on the 
panel on The value o f nature in Buddhist tradition at the IABS conference in Lausanne in 
August 99 where some facets of the present paper were presented—for their most valuable 
criticisms and suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to Peter Schwabland and, especially, 
Anne MacDonald, who kindly corrected my English.
2 Angelika Krebs, Ethics o f nature (Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 1999); cp. id. (ed.)„ 
Naturethik(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 7-12 and 337-379.
that part o f  our world which has not been made by human beings, 
but comes into existence and vanishes, changes and remains con­
stant in virtue of itself.
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Examples would be animals, plants, stones, rivers, mountains, and planets.
The opposite of “mature” in this sense is “artefact”, something 
made by human beings: tables, computers, statues, and so on.3
3 Krebs 1999, p. 6; 1997, p. 340.
4 Krebs 1999, p. 6; 1997, pp. 340-341.
5 Krebs 1997, p. 341. In Krebs 1999, p. 9, the limitation is expressed by the terms “ethics 
of nature” in a narrow sense, or “ethics of nonhuman nature”.
6 Krebs 1997, p. 8; 1999, p. 9.
7 Krebs 1997, pp. 8-9.
Nowadays, however, pure nature has become rare on this earth; almost 
everywhere it has now been remodeled or affected by human activity. On the 
other hand, there are no pure  artefacts either, because everything is, in the 
last analysis, made of raw materials taken from nature. Thus, today, most of 
reality is distributed on a scale between the extremes “pure nature” and 
“pure artefact” .4 We may designate something as “natural” in the propor­
tion to which the natural in it outweighs human influence. Man as a biolog­
ical entity is, to be sure, basically “natural” , but I follow Krebs in that in the 
ethics of nature man figures merely as the subject whose behaviour is at 
stake, and not as object, as, e.g., in medical ethics.5
3. Within the ethics of nature, Krebs makes a distinction between animal 
ethics, concerned with the sentient part of nature, and environmental or eco­
logical ethics, concerned also with the other part of nature.6 However, 
according to this definition, animal ethics would seem to be merely a special 
area of the wider field of ecological ethics. Furthermore, as Krebs herself 
points out,7 the distinction tends to become additionally blurred when not 
only animals but also other parts of nature—e.g. plants, or even the whole 
earth (“Gaia”)—are regarded as somehow sentient. For this reason, I sug­
gest a slightly different distinction, viz. between ethics o f  nature concerned 
with individuals, on the one hand, and ecological ethics, on the other. As for 
individuals, I primarily think of sentient individuals, subject to some form or 
other of suffering (like pain, fear, or stress), hence, in the first place, o f ani­
mals (as individuals: “animal ethics”). But plants and even formations o f the 
elements may also be taken into account when they are focussed upon as 
individuals (as, e.g., a single tree), still more so if they, too, are regarded as 
sentient. In contrast to this, I take ecological ethics to be concerned with
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eco-systems, or landscapes, and with biodiversity (i.e., species'), hence with 
levels normally regarded as supra-individual.8
To be sure, both levels are somehow interrelated: individuals belong to a 
species and exist in an eco-system, species become extinct if all individuals 
belonging to it die, and the collapse of an eco-system may cause the death of 
individuals inhabiting it. Nevertheless, the ’interests’ (if I may say so) or 
values at stake in ethics concerned with individuals on the one hand and in 
ecological ethics on the other do not always coincide and may at times con­
flict. Individuals want to survive and to achieve maximum propagation, 
whereas the eco-system and its biodiversity is based on balance,9 involving 
the death of surplus individuals. An endemic species may be threatened with 
extinction by an intruding species, and in order to preserve the endangered 
species it may be necessary to remove or even kill the intruders; but such an 
action is definitely not in the interest of the intruders as individuals. From 
the point of view o f ecological ethics, members of an endangered species 
would be more valuable than members of a common species,10 whereas ani­
mal ethics would not apply this criterium but might posit, e.g., a gradation of 
value in accordance with psychic complexity or sensitivity (which would 
hardly work as an ecological criterium). Nor would it, in the context of ani­
mal ethics, matter to what extent animals are natural in the sense of not hav­
ing been transformed by domestication, breeding or gene technology:11 a 
domestic animal is just as liable to experience suffering as a wild one.
I admit that even given this distinction, the delimitation between ecologi­
cal ethics and ethics referring to individuals tends to become less clear-cut if 
not only individual animals but even individual plants, not to speak o f indi­
vidual formations o f the elements, are regarded as being sentient and hence 
(or for some other reason) as entitled to being treated on ethical principles. 
But as a categorical distinction, the delimitation between ecological ethics 
and ethics referring to individuals would seem to remain valid. This 
becomes clear when one recalls the view of at least mainstream Jainism that, 
e.g., a lake is not only a habitat for animals but consists, at the same time, of 
innumerable minute drop-like individual (and dimly sentient) water­
beings.12
8 Cp. also Steven C. Rockefeller in: T/W, pp. 318-319.
9 Which is not of course an entirely static state: see § III.O.
10 Cp. Rockefeller in: T/W, p. 318; cp. also the authors quoted in Yamamoto 1998, p. 164.
I I Although the transformation process itself may run counter to the principles of animal 
ethics if, e.g., it results in a disabled creature.
12 Walter Schubring, Die Lehre der Jainas (Berlin/Leipzig, 1935), p. 133.
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4. In the following sections of my paper I shall try to ascertain, mainly from 
the point of view of a historian of ideas, to what extent and in which way 
some form of ethics of nature is rooted in the Buddhist tradition. In view of 
limits of time and competence, I shall confine myself almost entirely to the 
Indian Buddhist tradition, primarily to its earlier phase which forms the 
basis for all later developments. From a Far Eastern Buddhist point of view, 
completely different answers and solutions may be available.13
13 Cp., e.g., Paul O. Ingram, Steve Odm, Graham Parks, and Ruben L.F. Habito in: T/W, 
pp. 71-128 and 165-175; Otani 1993; Yamamoto 1998 and 1999 (with further references on 
p. 941).
14 Cp. Rockefeller in: T/W, p. 318.
15 Abstention from killing living beings is not explicitly mentioned as an element of spiri­
tual practice (of solitary renunciants) in the Atthakavagga, the typical parts of which rather 
insist on the futility of right behaviour or morality {sila, e.g. Sn 790; 839ab). But apart from 
the fact that notwithstanding their undoubted antiquity, the position of these texts in the 
development of early Buddhism is problematic (cp. Tilmann Vetter, “Some remarks on older 
parts of the Suttanipata,” in: David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen [eds.], Earliest 
Buddhism and Madhyamaka, Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill, 1990, pp. 42-52), the futility of sila 
hardly means that it may be dispensed with (cp. Sn 839cd) but rather that it is not sufficient 
(Sn 898) and that one should not cling to it (Sn 798d) or boast about it (Sn 782-783; 887).
16 Cp. S/M, pp. 181-182.
17 Friendliness or compassion with regard to animals: e.g. AN  II 72-73 = Vin II 109-110; 
Vin III 62; Sn 967b (mettaya phasse tasa-thavarani, including both animals and plants: cp. 
Plants, p. 62); monks who kill animals being accused of lack of friendliness or compassion: 
T. 1421 (XXII) 58a25; 1425 (XXII) 377b9-10; 1428 (XXII) 677al —5. Cp. also the emphasis on 
sympathy (daya) and caring (anukampa) in the detailed formulation of the first precept (see 
below § 2.a); cp. S/M, pp. 183-184.
II. Ethics of nature concerned with individuals
II. A. Animal ethics
1. Animal ethics is firmly rooted in traditional Buddhism from the outset, 
and is perhaps the most important contribution Buddhism has to make to a 
new ethics of nature.14 As is well known, not to kill living beings is the first 
moral precept or commitment of both Buddhist monks and lay people,15 and 
as a matter of course, living beings (pcina, prana/-niri) include animals.16 
Additionally, both monks and pious lay people are recommended to culti­
vate friendliness (metta, maitri) and compassion (karuna) with regard to the 
whole world, including animals.17 This implies that Buddhists should also 
abstain from hurting or torturing animals, and should help them in cases of
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emergency.18 From a traditional Buddhist point of view, slaughtering or 
hunting animals for food or other requirements, not to mention for fun, is 
blameworthy and unwholesome.19 The same would hold good for the mod­
em mass rearing of fowl and other animals. Even animal experiments for 
medical research would seem to be highly problematic if  they involve killing 
or the inflicting of pain, the more so animal tests for other purposes, and 
vivisection.20
18 Cp., e.g., M N II 371; Ud II.3 (pp.l 1-12: the Buddha upbraids boys beating a snake). Gift 
to animals recommended: S/M, pp. 184-185; cp. also Asoka, Pillar Edict 2: dupada-catu- 
padesu pakhi-valicalesu vividhe me anugahe kate. Saving fish from an evaporating lake: 
Suvarnabhasottama-siitra (ed. Johannes Nobel, Leipzig, 1937), ch. XVII. On the problems of 
ceremonial release of animals (which presupposes or even encourages previous capture) see 
Duncan Rytiken Williams in: T/W, pp. 155-156; also S/M, p. 201 with ns. 181-182.
19 Cp., e.g., MN I 343-344, etc.; AKBh 240,19-20 (tatra lobhaja<h> pranatipato 
yathci taccharlravayavartham arthartham kridartham [text °ta °] ca praninam jivitdd 
vyaparopayati) and 243,4-9; Cp. also Toni Huber, “The Chase and the Dharma: The Legal 
Protection of Wild Animals in Pre-modem Tibet,” in: John Knight (ed.) Wild Animals in 
Asia, London: Curzon Press (forthcoming).
20 An engaged pleading, by a Western Buddhist, against animal experiments and vivisec­
tion is found in Tony Page, Buddhism and Animals (London: Ukavis, 1999), pp. 148-171.
21 E.g. MN I 285-288; 313-315; III 203; TWI 211; II 226; 253; III 35; 204; 275-276; 432; 
IV 251-255 etc.; V 264-268; 283-287, etc. Similarly injuring: MN III 204.
22 E.g., D N \251; II 250-251; M N II 194-195; A N II 128-129; IV 151; V 342.
23 For details see below (§ 4.a).
24 Fa-tsang’s commentary to the Fan-wang-ching (T. 1813 (XL) 609cl5-16) states that 
killing living beings is a gross evil act that prevents one from entering the Path.
2. What do the texts present as the reason or motive for abstention from 
killing or injuring?
a) At least in the Pali canon, lay persons are mainly induced to abstain 
through being made aware of the karmic result, which is usually desirable 
rebirth (mostly in heaven) for abstention from killing, and evil rebirth for 
killing, especially for habitual killing or slaughtering.21 Similarly', cultivat­
ing friendliness and compassion is, especially in the case of lay persons, 
often recommended as a unique source of ‘merit’ or as a means for rebirth in 
Brahma’s heaven.22 In the case of monks (and nuns), on the other hand, 
abstention from killing any living being is both an element of formal monas­
tic discipline23 (i.e. a matter of purity of conduct as expected of renunciants 
by society) and a basic requirement for the path to liberation24 (i.e. an ele-
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ment of spiritual purity). In the latter context, the texts prefer to use a more 
elaborate formulation of the first precept which stresses that its observance 
is based on sympathy (day a) with and concern (anukampa) for living 
beings.25 These attitudes are closely related to the meditative cultivation of 
friendliness and compassion, which serves to eliminate unwholesome emo­
tions like hatred and the drive or readiness to injure others.26
25 E.g., DA M ; 63; 171; 181; MN I 179; 267; 345; III 33; TAII 208; V 204. This formula is 
occasionally also used in connection with lay people—to indicate ideal behaviour (MAI 287; 
III 203; A N N  266, etc.; cp. also Sn 117) and, regularly, in connection with uposatha (AN I 
211; IV 249, etc.)—, but much less frequently than the non-elaborate formula (which does not 
mention sympathy and concern), which in its turn is rarely used in connection with monks. 
The close connection of abstention from killing with sympathy and concern is also explicit at 
TAII 176,27-33. According to Fa-tsang’s commentary to the Fan-wang-ching (T. 1813 (XL) 
609cl7-18), killing runs counter to compassion.
26 E.g., AN  III 290-291; DA III 247-248; AKBh 452,7.
27 SAV 353-354; Udp. 47 (V.l); Dhp 129-130.
28 Sn 704-705; cp. K.R. Norman, Collected Papers III (Oxford: PTS, 1992), p. 68; Plants, 
pp. 59-65.
29 S/M, p. 203 n. 195.
30 Drfll.l; Dv XXX.18; cp. DAI 70,4-5.
31 See below § III.3.C and n. 193.
b) That abstention from killing or injuring ought to be based on sympathy 
(or empathy) with living beings (and not merely on fear and expectation) is 
further corroborated by the fact that in order to impress right behaviour on 
people—renunciants as well as lay people—recourse is sometimes taken to 
the ‘Golden Rule Just as one oneself wants to live and be happy but is 
afraid of death and suffering, so too all other living beings; how then could 
one kill or injure them?27 Since animals are living, sentient beings, the 
Golden Rule holds good with regard to them as well.28 The Golden Rule is, 
to be sure, not specifically Buddhist,29 but it has the advantage of appealing 
directly to the heart, and of being independent of doctrinal presuppositions, 
including that of karma and rebirth. And it is its own reward in that “restraint 
with regard to living beings is innocuous happiness” .30
I do not think that respecting animals as sentient beings in early Buddhism 
is a consequence of the idea that animals may be reborn as humans and vice 
versa, since arguments for ethical behaviour towards animals based on the 
perviousness of forms of existence in the context of rebirth seem to emerge 
only later.31 It was rather the common property of sentient life that was
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decisive for including animals in the precept not to kill (see also below § 
II.5.a).
c) There is a tendency in contemporary writings on Buddhist ethics to derive 
compassion and caring for others from the specifically Buddhist doctrine or 
awareness of the non-existence of a true Self (dtmaw).32 There is no doubt 
that in most later schools this doctrine (henceforward: doctrine of “no-Self”) 
was central, but in the early canonical texts there is, as far as I know, hardly 
any unambiguous explicit formulation,33 though some passages may come 
close to it.34 What is frequently found are statements that the constituents of 
a person—body etc. —, or even all dhammas, are not the or a Self (hence­
forward: “nof-Self’). But I am not aware of any canonical passage deriving 
compassion from this idea, and even in later literature such a derivation 
appears to be rare.35 According to the basic canonical text on “not-Self the 
insight that the constituents of a person, etc., are not Self or Mine because 
they are impermanent and hence unsatisfactory only leads to becoming dis­
gusted with them (nibbida), and this results in detachment (virago) and lib-
32 E.g. Malcolm David Eckel in: T/W, pp. 342-346, esp. 344 (“. . . this basic Buddhist 
conceptual movement from no-self to interdependence to compassion”).
33 The Sabbasavasutta (MN\ 8), e.g., criticizes not only the view (ditthi) that one has a Self 
(atthi me atta ti) and that it is permanent and unchangeable, but likewise the view that one has 
no Self (n'atthi me atta ti). Even the Alagaddupamasutta (MN I 135-136, taken by K.R. 
Norman, Collected Papers II [Oxford: PTS 1991], pp. 200-209, to prove the non-existence 
of a Self) actually seems to reject merely a specific Vedic view of Self because due to it one 
might misunderstand the teaching of the Buddha as ucchedavada (cp. Emst Steinkellner, 
“Lamotte and the Concept of Anupalabdhi,” Asiatische Studien 46.1 [1992]: 406; id., “Asati 
in the Alagaddupamasutta,” forthcoming in Felicitation vol. for Sree Jambuvijayaji; 
Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, “Once More on a Passage of the Alagaddilpama-sutta,” in: 
Bauddhavidyasudhakarah [see n. 68]: 25-28; id., Some Thoughts on Early Buddhism, Pune: 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1998, pp. 9-13). And Dhp 62 (atta hi attano n ’atthi, 
kutoputta, kuto dhanam; cp. Uv 1.20) is more naturally understood in a spiritual sense than in 
a doctrinal one: “One does not [even really] own oneself (since one may, e.g., die at any 
time), how much less sons or wealth!”
34 The most advanced one is probably SV I 135 (the nun Vajira; cp. AKBh 465,22-466,4 
and SA no. 1202: Saila); AKBh 466,8-13 (= Yogacarabhumi: Paramarthagatha 2-4) has no 
counterpart in the Pali Par ay ana.
35 Most remarkable, to my knowledge, is Bodhicaryavatara VIII. 101-103 (critically dis­
cussed in Paul Williams, Altruism and Reality, Richmond Surrey: Curzon Press 1998, pp. 
104-176). Cp. also Srdvakabhiimi (ed. Karunesha Shukla, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research 
Institute, 1973), p. 378,15-19 (cp. Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi, Wohlwollen, Mitleid, 
Freude und Gleichmut [Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999], pp. 279 and 298 [i; cp. also ii]).
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eration (vimutti).36
36 E.g., Vin I 13-14; MN I 138-139; III 19f; SA  II 124-125, etc.; Mahdsiitras, ed. Peter 
Skilling, I (Oxford: PTS 1994), pp. 100-106 and 125-126.
37 This is expressly stated in later sources: e.g. AKBh 461,4: atmagraha-prabhavas ca 
sarva-klesah’, Dharmakirti, Pramanavarttika 11.135 and 212 (see Tilmann Vetter, Der 
Buddha und seine Lehre in DharmaJdrtis Pramanavarttika, Wien: Arbeitskreis fur tibetische 
und buddhistische Studien, 1984, pp. 42 and 112).
38 Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 452,5; 453,8f; 454,1; ASBh 124,12. In Mahayana there is, to be sure, a
threefold pattern of friendliness and compassion referring to living beings, dharmas and 
nothing (or tathata), respectively, but in my opinion this is precisely an attempt to harmonize 
compassion with the doctrine of “no-Self’ and Emptiness (cf. my paper quoted in the fol­
lowing note, § 5; cp. also Maithrimurthi, op.cit. [see n. 35], pp. 250; 258-262; Wakahara 
Yusho “Mu-en no jihi” (*“Compassion without object: caturapramana in Yogacara
Tradition”), in: Btikkyo ni okeru wahei, Nihon bukkyd gakkai nempd 61 (1996): 91-108).
According to my (admittedly rather conservative) understanding o f early 
monastic Buddhism, its primary aim was the individual’s liberation from 
suffering and rebirth. In keeping with this, a person who has attained arhat- 
ship states that this was his (or her) last birth and that he (or she) will not 
return. As is well known, the central cause for rebirth is craving (tanha), 
which may be understood as being rooted in or consisting in self-centered­
ness, and this is also the basis for other unwholesome emotions like hatred 
or aggressiveness.37 Hence, many spiritual practices are, directly or indi­
rectly, aimed at breaking up self-centeredness, either by “imploding” it (like 
the contemplation o f “not-Self” ) or by “exploding” it (like the cultivation of 
friendliness or compassion extended to all living beings, or the Golden Rule, 
which takes the notion o f ‘se lf  and ‘others’ for granted but transcends the 
boundary by realizing the analogy). Thus, as spiritual practices, the contem­
plation of not-self on the one hand and compassion or the Golden Rule on 
the other are independent of each other, or at best complementary.
Logically, too, the mere “implosion” of self-centeredness by means of the 
contemplation of “not-Self ’ does, to be sure, eradicate selfish activity, but 
does not seem to entail, of necessity, active concern for others unless an 
additional “explosive” momentum emerges, probably due to previous culti­
vation of empathy or compassion. When the spirituality o f “woZ-Self” 
became dogmatized into a doctrine of “no-Self ’ in which holistic persons 
and living beings were dissolved into mere bundles of factors, this resulted 
in a certain tension or even incompatibility between this level o f ultimate 
denial of Selves or holistic living beings on the one hand and compassion as 
essentially referring to just living beings38 on the other, with the tendency to
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relegate compassion to the conventional level. This tension between “no­
S e lf’ (or Emptiness, for that matter) and compassion is occasionally palpa­
ble even in Mahayana sources.39
39 Cp., e.g., Bodhicaryavatara(-panjikd) IX.76; Kamalaslla, 1st Bhavanakrama, in: 
Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II (Rome: Is.M.E.O. 1958), pp. 217,18-19 and 
221,11-15 (read lokottarajhdna-prayoga°, and probably °bhdvim and °nivesim). For further 
evidence and discussion see L. Schmithausen, “Mitleid und Leerheit: Zu Spiritualitat und 
Heilsziel des Mahayana,” in: A. Bsteh (ed.), Der Buddhismus als Anfrage an christliche 
Theologie und Philosophie (Studien zur Religionstheologie, 5), Modling, 2000, §§ 4 and 5.
40 E.g., Mahdydnasutrdlankdra(-bhdsya) (ed. Sylvain Levi, Paris 1907) XIV.30-31 and 
37-38; cp. IX.23 and 70-71 (cp. also Naoya Funahashi, Mahaydnasutralamkara (Chapter I, 
II, III, IX, X), Tokyo 1985, and, for ch. XIV, Akemi Iwamoto in: Zen Bunka Kenkyujo Kiyo 21 
[1995], pp. 10-29); Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (ed. Gadjin M. Nagao) 35,10-11.
41 RGV 1.119f, following the Tathagatagarbha-sutra.
42 Kanjur (Peking), mDo, vol. Tsu: 203b7-8; 204bl and 3-4; T. 120 (II) 540c2-4; 22-23; 
26-27; cp. Seyfort Ruegg 1980 (see n. 122), p. 236. According to RGV 1.166, the doctrine of 
tathagata-garbha leads to respect for all sentient beings and great benevolence.
43 Yamamoto (1999, p. 942), if I understand him correctly, takes me to have propounded, 
in BN, a restriction of Buddha-Nature to animals, that is, its exclusion from plants, for the 
sake of underpinning the present-day need for people to give up eating meat. Actually, it is
d) As against that, in early Yogacara sources the experience of the selfless­
or essencelessness of all dharmas is in fact understood as the starting-point 
for attaining, on a deeper level of experience than that accessible by way of 
the mere Golden Rule, the notion of the equality of self and others or the 
“view of a vast se lf ’ (mahatmadrsti) which leads to Great Compassion 
motivating the inclusion of all living beings into one’s striving for libera­
tion.40 But here, what is decisive for the inclusion of others into one’s notion 
of self is not merely the “implosive” aspect of selflessness but more the 
“explosive” aspect of its all-pervasiveness (sarvatragatd), the fact that it is 
the dharmadhatu or true essence of oneself as well as of others. Perhaps this 
development was prepared for by the introduction of the concept of 
tathagata-garbha, of latent or potential Buddhahood, whose presence and 
essential identity in all living beings, including animals,41 is, e.g. in the 
Ahgulimdliyasutra?2 expressly used to demonstrate why Buddhas do not 
kill any living being and do not even eat meat.43
3. What is the value preserved or gained through abstaining from killing, or, 
conversely, the value that is destroyed or lost through killing or injuring a
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living being? This is no doubt an important question, but not an easy one to 
answer, because, as far as I can see, it is not systematically dealt with in the 
early sources.44 The following reflections are largely hypothetical and 
entirely provisional.
a) If we start from the motivations for abstaining from killing (and injuring) 
living beings discussed above (§ 2.a), it is, in the first place, the Golden Rule 
that points to values at stake, viz. life and happiness. Accordingly, dying and 
pain (or suffering) are indicated as anti-values.45 The reason why these two 
pairs are, respectively, values and anti-values is the fact that living, sentient 
beings^6 naturally experience them in this way. In the context of practical 
behaviour towards other living beings (including animals'), this has to be 
respected.
b) However, in the crucial context of liberating insight both life and happi­
ness, at any rate in the ordinary sense of biological life and pleasure or feel-
the Indian sources that teach the presence of the tathagata-garbha, or buddha-dhatu, as a 
soteriological principle (which does not make sense for Yamamoto because he excludes the 
doctrine of rebirth: see n. 99), in all sentient beings including animals (but of course not 
plants because by that time plants have come to be explicitly excluded from the realm of sen­
tient beings: see Plants, p. 82), and it is in the Ahgulimallya-sutra that this presupposition is 
explicitly employed for the sake of discouraging meat eating. I admit that I personally try to 
avoid meat if possible, but this is simply my reaction as a consumer to the cruelties of the 
modem mass rearing of cattle and poultry and to brutal and ecologically unsound fishing 
methods. It is not that I feel perfectly at ease with eating or cutting plants (something I can­
not avoid), enigmatic forms of life as they are. But even if (as Yamamoto, loc.cit., states) the 
border-line between animals and plants may be blurred (just as, for that matter, the one 
between animals and humans, especially if we take former stages of evolution into account), 
this does not mean that there is no significant difference between the bulk of the animal and 
the vegetable kingdom. Just as over-stressing this difference may be motivated by the opti­
mistic hope to be on the safe side through practising vegetarianism, so ignoring the difference 
may be an excuse for a reluctance to renounce meat.
44 A late but interesting passage enumerating a tenfold intention of the precept (for bodhi­
sattvas) not to kill any living being (which may also contain hints at the values involved) is 
found in Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Fan-wang-ching'. T. 1813 (XL) 609cl3-610a7.
45 In other contexts like the canonical explanation of the first Truth of the Nobles, dying is 
subsumed under what is painful. At M N  I 371, the painfulness of dying is pointed out with 
special reference to animals being slaughtered.
46 Though we do find, in later Theravada dogmatics, the idea of purely material (vegetable) 
life (Plants § 30), what is taken into consideration by Buddhists in the ethical context is mere­
ly sentient living beings.
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ing happy, turn out to be ultimately unsatisfactory in view of their imperma­
nence and hence can no longer be regarded as values, at least not as ultimate 
values. The ultimate value, from this point of view, must rather be libera­
tion,47 nirvana. But what is it that makes nirvana a value? May it not be 
taken as a special, exalted form of life or happiness?
47 Thus expressly NA 715bl0: Ig&d1, S W M ; 714c4: 1 0 ^4 , cp. TSi
257cl5-16.
48 Cp. the general statement SV I 97,28 and Uv 1.23.
49 E.g., Dhp 203-204; Uv xxvi.6; XXX.17-19; 28-31, etc.
50 Thus explicitly Mil 44,19-31; cp. also Lambert Schmithausen, Der Nirvana-Abschnitt 
in der Viniscayasamgrahani der Yogacarabhumih (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften 1969), pp. 40-43 (§ l.b).
51 E.g. Th 20 and 606; Mil 44,32-45,6.
52 Cp. Th 71 Off; Upasenasutra, in: E. Waldschmidt, Von Ceylon bis Turfan (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), p. 341; AKBh 44,2-3; Vi 656cl7—18; cp. also MN 111 
269,7-15.
53 AKBh 43,15-17 (quotation from the Jhanaprasthana) and 43,24-44,1 (atha kimartham 
utsrjanti? alpam ca parahitam jivite pasyanti, rogabhibhutam catmabhavam; cp. Vi 
656c 12-16); Schmithausen 1969 (see n. 50), p. 42-43 (not all arhats are capable of aban­
doning their life-span impulses); cp. also Ud VIII.9, but the (convincing) interpretation of the 
text in terms of abandoning the ayu-sahkharas is rejected by the “orthodox” Theravada com­
mentator (Ud-a 431,18-432,7). On the other hand, if a saint prolongs his life it is only for the 
sake of the welfare of others or for the continuation of the Buddhist Teaching (AKBh 
43,23-24; Vi 656a20-b5). Cp. also Mil 195,25-196,12, stating that the Vinaya prohibits sui­
cide because virtuous monks should remain in the world for the benefit of living beings.
c) Nirvana is, to be sure, normally attained while the person is still alive, but 
as with ordinary persons, so also in the case of a liberated person biological 
life invariably ends with dying,48 is hence impermanent and hardly an ulti­
mate value. Though liberation is often declared to entail the highest form of 
happiness,49 this happiness, flowing as it does from detachment or from an 
anticipation of final nirvana to be attained at death, does not appear to be an 
aim in itself but rather a harbinger or foretaste of final nirvana, nor does it of 
necessity protect the liberated person from physical pain.50 Actually, in con­
trast to ordinary living beings, saints (i.e. fully liberated persons, arhats) do 
not regard their biological life as something valuable and are indifferent to 
it,51 or are even glad to get rid of it.52 According to the Sarvastivada tradi­
tion, such persons may go as far as to voluntarily abandon their life-span 
impulses (ayuh-samskara') in order to die prematurely,53 and the Buddha 
himself is reported to have done so after he found that his Teaching was
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firmly established.54 There are even a couple of canonical suttantas obvi­
ously reporting cases of saints committing suicide by means of a knife or 
sword on account of intolerable physical pain or in order to prevent them­
selves from losing their spiritual attainment.55 To be sure, part of the 
Buddhist tradition has taken exception to the idea of arhats being unwilling 
to endure physical pain and hence prematurely ending their lives, especially 
because they employ a violent method.56 But according to the Sarvastivada 
tradition such an act is legitimate when loss (parihani) of the arhat status57 
is at stake (as in the case of Godhika/Gautika).58 And even the Vinaya tradi­
tion allows a sick monk to stop eating (at the risk of him fasting to death) 
when he is sure that his spiritual perfection is close at hand.59
54 DA ii 104-108.
55 AV nos. 22.87 (Vakkali; SA no. 1265), 35.87 (Channa,=MAno. 144; SA no. 1266) and 
4.23 (Godhika; SA no. 1091; SA2 no. 30; the latter version expressly states that Gautika has 
eradicated atmadrsti: T. 100 (II) 382cl2:K ^® ^). There are numerous studies on the prob­
lems posed by these texts: see Damien Keown, “Buddhism and Suicide: The Case of 
Channa,” JBE 3 (1996): 8-31 (with further references on p. 9, n. 1); Padmasiri de Silva, 
“Suicide and Emotional Ambivalence: An Early Buddhist Perspective,” in: Frank J. Hoffman 
and Deegalle Mahinda (eds.), Pali Buddhism, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996, pp.l 17-132, esp. 
124-130; Sugimoto Takushu, Gokai no shiihen (Kyoto: Heirakuji-shoten, 1999), pp. 75-109 
(further references: ibid., p. 109 n. 6).
56 E.g., SN-a I 183-184; Mil 44,31-34. According to this tradition, the persons committing 
suicide are not yet arhats and become so only after having carried out the fatal act, liberating 
insight flashing up just when they are on the verge of death: cp. SN-a II 372,11-22; Keown, 
op.cit. (see n. 55); T. 125 (II) 642b29-643a22 (Ekottara version of The Vakkali story). Cp. 
also TSi 257cl4-17, AKBh 376,4-6 and the opponent at M4 715a23-28 and 710b3-6, where 
similar views are advocated against the Sarvastivadin view of loss of arWship. Nevertheless, 
in the AKBh passage the attainment of aHm/ship when one is on the verge of death is linked 
up with the person’s disregard for his body and life (kaya-fivita-nirapeksatvat).
57 The loss may be due to prolonged illness: TSi 257b29—c l; cp. AKBh 373,5-6 and SN-a I 
183,4. At any rate, as Thomas Oberlies suggests in an unpublished paper, the arhat's resort­
ing to violent suicide makes sense in view of the urgency of the situation which excludes a 
smooth but slow method like fasting to death. In addition, the specific method of “taking the 
knife” may perhaps indicate a ksatriya background.
58 Cp., e.g., Vi 320b9—19; NA 715al4-c8; cp. also the definitions of the category of the 
cetanadharman arhat at, e.g., Kz 319c 10 and NA 110a20-b3. A detailed investigation into the 
problem of suicide in Indian and Chinese Buddhism will be undertaken by my student Martin 
Delhey.
59 Sp 467; cp. Damien Keown, “Attitudes to Euthanasia in the Vinaya and Commentary,” 
JBE 6 (1999): 260-270, esp. p. 268.
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d) Thus, the ultimate value is obviously not (biological) life but nirvana, 
especially final nirvana, i.e. the state a liberated person attains at death. Now 
Damien Keown60 suggests that life is a value in Buddhism (not, it is true, an 
absolute one, but a basic one) because it reaches its perfection in final 
nirvana. But as far as I can see, at least in the Pali canon the terms used for 
biological life, viz. ayus (“life-span”) and jivita, are never applied to final 
nirvana (after death), and thus it appears that “life” was felt to be inextrica­
bly linked up with dying, and “life-span” with limitation. On the other hand, 
in early Buddhism the term amata/amrta is used for nirvana but not for bio­
logical life, and as an equivalent of nirvana it need not imply anything but 
that nirvana is a state unaffected by dying.61
60 Keown 1995, pp. 49-50 and 59.
61 I take mrta in this compound as an action noun (cp. Jakob Wackemagel & Albert 
Debrunner, Altindische GrammatikW.2, p. 586, line 1).
62 Cp. Tilmann Vetter, The Ideas and Meditative Practices o f Early Buddhism (Leiden, 
1988), pp. 44 and 65-66. Cp. also Bhattacharya 1998 (see n. 33), pp. 24-31.
63 Especially by the line DN I 223,17 obviously “correcting” 223,12-16 (cp. MN, I 
329,30-31). A similar situation may be reflected in MN no. 38. Cp. also Ud VIII. 1.
64 Ud VIII.10 (Uv XXX.35-36); Itivuttaka p. 37 (no. 43; cp. Uv XXVI.22-23); probably SA 
298b7-9. But cp. Ud 1.10 (sukha-dukkhapamuccati).
At best, one could refer to the scarce vestiges of a view, more or less 
expurged by tradition, that in final nirvana the liberated person’s vijnana, the 
sentience that kept his body alive, dissolves into cosmic vijnana.62 
Doubtless sentience, or sentient life, is a basic presupposition for the 
Buddhist version of the Golden Rule in that it determines its range of appli­
cation. But even if, in spite of its rejection by the mainstream canonical tra­
dition,63 the idea that sentience somehow continues into final nirvana is 
accepted, what would be of ultimate value would not be sentience in any 
condition but sentience in the condition of nirvana. The reason why sentient 
living beings should not be killed or tortured might then be assumed to lie in 
the fact that they are, so to speak, sanctified because their sentience includes 
the potential to attain or realize this ultimate value. But there does not seem 
to be any canonical textual support for this idea.
e) Whereas the terns for biological life do not seem to be applied to final 
nirvana (after death), its characterization as happiness (sukha) is occasional­
ly met with.64 On the whole, however, this qualification, too, tends to be 
avoided, probably in order to avoid the connotation of a temporary psychic 
state. There is, however, no problem in designating final nirvana as freedom
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from dying and suffering. Hence, it may be preferable to define the ultimate 
value in negative or abstract terms like “state where there is no dying” 
(amata/amrta), “end of suffering” (dukkhass ’ anto),65 “freedom from dan­
ger/fear” (ab hay a),66 “security” or “welfare” (khemafitf or “ultimate secu­
rity from bondage” (anuttara yogakkhema),^ all of which occur, along with 
further quasi-synonyms pointing in the same direction, as designations of 
nirvana,69 no matter whether nirvana is envisaged as being attained or expe-
65 Cp., e.g., Ud VIII. 1 and 4; Uv XXVI.20; 24-25.
66 Cp. also Therigatha verse 512; SN I 33,9: abhayanama sa disa (SN-a 1 87: nibbanam 
sandhaya).
67 Cp. also AN I 142,18-21 (cp. t/vXXX.17); 77t 227; MN I 227,10-13; Vimdnavatthu, ed. 
E.R. Gooneratne (London: PTS 1886), p. 53,25; Uv VI.20a; VIII. 15b.—Security (khemd) as 
the ultimate value is also compatible with the Atthakavagga (Sn 809d; 896d; 953d; cp. also 
the anti-value bhaya at Sn 935 (Attadanda-suttaf), though in this collection emphasis is 
decidedly on inner peace (cp. Sn 837) tn this life. Yet, I presume that destiny after death was 
no matter of concern because this inner peace was experienced as irreversible (for this reason, 
even if Sn 877cd bhavabhavaya na sameti dhiro is, perhaps, part of a secondary textual layer, 
it still seems plausible that when the question whether the wise man will be reborn became 
acute it was, of course, denied; cp. also Sn 902cd). Anyway, I fail to perceive, in the Atthaka­
vagga collection, any life-affirming ideal (as suggested by Grace G. Burford, Desire, Death 
and Goodness, New York etc.: Peter Lang 1991, p. 13), in the sense that if all attachment is 
abandoned, life may become something worthwhile or may even be experienced as a state of 
pure happiness (ibid., p. 188; the only occurrence of sukha in the Atthakavagga is at Sn 873, 
where the condition due to which both suffering and happiness will disappear is asked for). 
Rather, even the typical texts of the collection (cp. Vetter 1990 [see n. 15]), not to mention 
the less typical ones, suggest an ideal of solitude (Sn 844; cp. 810; 821), of radical non­
involvement or non-commitment, and of complete freedom from attachment and clinging to 
both this world and the other (801: idha va huram va), to both life (cp. Sn 804) and death (cp. 
Sn 856cd: bhavaya vibhavdya va tanha yassa na vijjati).
68 Cp. K.R. Norman, Collected Papers IV (Oxford: PTS 1993): 278-279; Shozen Kumoi, 
“The Concept of Yoga in the Nikayas," in: Petra Kieffer-Piilz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (eds.), 
Bauddhavidyasudhakarah: Studies in Honour o f Heinz Bechert, (Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica 
et Tibetica, 1997), pp. 408-412.
69 SN IV 369-373 (for parallel materials see L. Schmithausen, “Yogacarabhumi: Sopadhika 
and Nirupadhika Bhumih,” in: Li Zheng et al. [eds.], Papers in Honour o f Prof Dr. JiXianlin 
on the Occasion o f His 80th Birthday, [Peking] 1991, [p. 710] n.104; in the Nirupadhika 
Bhiimi of the Yogacarabhumi [loc.cit., § 3], the terms are definitely listed as quasi-synonyms 
of final nirvana). Cp. also AN IV 454f, referring, to be sure, to nirvana in this world (i.e. 
before death), but in the special context of sahhd-vedayita-nirodha which I take, in this stra­
tum, as a mystical anticipation of final nirvana, in spite of the objections by G.A. Somaratne 
(in a lecture delivered on May 22th, 1998 at the 43rd International Conference of Eastern 
Studies in Tokyo) whose argument is based on the assertion that in the stereotyped sentence 
panhaya c ’assa disva asava parikkhina honti the past participle with hoti expresses the plu-
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rienced already in this life or as final nirvana after death. Actually, it is 
essentially this same set of values—which may be summarized as “wel­
fare”—that is sought for by ordinary living beings (be it here on earth or in 
the afterlife), but for them it is linked up with biological life and with the 
aspiration for happiness as a psychic (and even physical) state, and is hence 
constantly jeopardized.70 Even in this flawed form, the value of “welfare” is 
basically genuine, and the striving for it legitimate. The Golden Rule points 
out that this holds good, and should be respected, in the case of other sentient 
beings as well, and that therefore they must not be killed or tortured but 
should be treated benevolently.
f) However, as was pointed out in § 2.a, empathy (expressed in the Golden 
Rule) is not the only motive leading one to respect the life (and integrity) of 
other living beings. The karma doctrine makes clear that killing, injuring or 
damaging them has evil consequences for the perpetrator himself in the yon­
der world, i.e. that his gross infringement upon the welfare of others jeopar­
dizes his own welfare. Conversely, offering others freedom from danger and 
fear (abhaya') through abstaining from killing, etc., entails freedom from 
danger and fear, and happiness, for oneself.71 This holds good also with 
regard to animals because the karma doctrine appears to have integrated 
(and ethicized)72 the archaic idea (documented also in Vedic literature)73 
that killed sentient beings, especially animals, try to take revenge on the 
killer in the yonder world.74 Hence, one’s own attainment of welfare and
perfect, while actually its meaning is a state that has been reached (and continues): see Heinz 
Bechert, “Uber den Gebrauch der indikativischen Tempora im Pali,” Miinchner Studien zur 
Sprachwissenschaft 3 (1953/ 1958), p. 60 (“den erreichten Zustand”).
70 From an ultimate point of view, the whole of samsara is insecure: AKBh 202,21.
71 AN IV 246: pandtipata pativirato...ariyasavako aparimdnanam sattanam abhayam 
deti..., ...datva aparimanassa abhayassa...bhagl hod.
72 I.e. by substituting automatic retribution or punishment for individual revenge.
73 Cp., esp., Satapatabrahmaria XI.6.1 and Jaiminiyabrahmana 1.42-44.
74 I still think that Hanns-Peter Schmidt (“The Origin of ahimsa,” in: Melanges 
d ’lndianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou, Paris 1968: 625-655, esp. 643-649; “Ahimsa 
and Rebirth,” in: Michael Witzel [ed.J, Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts [Harvard Oriental 
Series, Opera Minora 2, Cambridge, 1997]: 207-234, esp. 214-215) is right in pointing out 
the importance of this belief for the origin of the ahimsa concept. This does not necessarily 
mean that this concept was developed by the ritualist Vedic tradition. The belief that killing 
animals entails the danger of revenge is far-spread in hunter-gatherer-cultures and was hard­
ly a specific belief of Vedic ritualists. Thus, it may well have formed the background for the
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security is dependent on one’s offering it to all other living beings, including 
animals.
g) In the case of ultimate, complete security, i.e. nirvana, this principle 
would seem to imply complete avoidance of killing or injuring any living 
being, even the smallest one. Actually, after a saint has attained the tran­
scendent and ineffable state offina l nirvana (after death) such complemen­
tarity, that is, of receiving and offering complete security, is a matter of 
course.75 Moreover, abstention from killing and injuring is, to be sure, 
required as a precondition for attaining this state. But in Buddhism absten­
tion from killing and injuring (as well as from other unwholesome actions) 
is not considered sufficient, and at the same time not normally inculcated in 
such a meticulous form as in Jainism. For Buddhists, bondage is essentially 
based on attachment and other unwholesome psychic, internal attitudes, dis­
positions or drives, and in order to attain liberation it is, in the first place, 
these internal factors that have to be eliminated by means of spiritual prac­
tices. Abstention from killing and injuring living beings is one of the pre­
suppositions of these practices and at the same time turned by them into a 
spontaneous, natural habit because they eliminate greed, hatred and (intel­
lectual) disorientation which are the sources of unwholesome actions like 
killing.76 It stands to reason that this holds good for intentional or conscious 
killing and injuring but hardly for unintended, accidental killing. This is not 
clearly expressed in the earlier, inherited Suttapitaka formulation o f the 
basic precepts which, like the early Jaina sources, uses the term panatipata 
for killing a living being. But it is explicitly stated in the more advanced for­
mulation, found in the Vinayapitaka and some suttantas, which employs
origin of the ahimsa concept if this took place in circles of non-ritualist or even non-Vedic 
renouncers or ascetics (as Henk W. Bodewitz proposes in “Hindu ahimsa and its roots,” in: 
Jan E.M. Houben and Karel R. van Kooij [eds.J, Violence Denied, Leiden: Brill, 1999: 
17-44). It should also be taken into account that the idea that the victim (or its congeners) 
will try to take revenge already presupposes a (maybe unreflected) assumption that the feel­
ings and reactions of other living beings are analogous to one’s own feelings and reactions. 
In the different milieu of renouncers, this awareness may easily have developed into the self- 
conscious empathy expressed in the Golden Rule, and gained additional momentum through 
the “irreproachable happiness” such kind of behaviour entails (see above § 2.b with n. 30).
75 This would hold good even if nirvana after death is understood, with AKBh 92,5-6, 
93,4-12 and 94,8, as mere annihilation.
76 AN I 201-202; 134-135; III 338-339; AKBh 240,15-16 (see SA 274b24-26) and 
240,18-241,17.
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jivita voropetid1 It is the latter terminology that is used in the statement that 
a monk in whom the unwholesome influxes have disappeared (i.e. an arhat) 
is incapable of intentionally killing a living being,78 thus implying that 
involuntary, accidental killing of a living being may occur for such a person 
but does not impair his saintly status. One might perhaps say that in 
Buddhism an archaic structure of a factual, objective reciprocity of security 
has become overlaid (but by no means replaced)79 with a more subjective, 
spiritualized concept in which true security or welfare is, in the first place, 
envisaged as a spiritual state of complete detachment basically dependent 
on one’s own spiritual attainments (eradication of greed, hatred, etc.).
h) It would be interesting to follow the value question into later forms of 
Buddhism (especially Mahayana and Vajrayana, and also into the regional 
forms of Theravada Buddhism) and to investigate whether there are any 
changes that might have affected animal ethics, but in this paper I can only 
roughly indicate some important shifts that would seem to have taken place 
concerning the value of welfare: Firstly, in contrast to early Buddhism 
where, roughly speaking, one’s own welfare seems to be the primary goal 
and being concerned about the welfare of others a presupposition for the for­
mer,80 in Mahayana, at least for the bodhisattva, caring for the welfare of 
others becomes the dominant goal.81 Secondly, in accordance with this
77 For the chronological significance of this change in terminology, see Oskar VON 
HlNiiBER, Das Patimokkhasutta der Theravadin, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999: 22 ff and 44 
ff. On the meaning ofpanatipata “killing living beings” see C. Caillat, “Words for Violence 
in the ‘Seniors’ of the Jaina Canon,” in: Jain Studies in Honour ofJozef Deleu, Tokyo, 1993: 
213-216. The expression jlviyao vavaroveti is absent from the so-called “seniors” of the 
Jaina canon but is found in Isibhasiyaim (ed. W. Schubring, Hamburg, 1969) 34 (p. 538, 
26-30) and, e.g., in the Avassaya-sutta (4.6: Jaina Agama Granthamala vol. 15, p. 337, 16) 
and the Bhagavatl Viyahapannatti (ib., vol. 4.1, p. 207, 19, etc.).
78 MN I 523=X7VIV 370-372 = DN III 235: abhabbo khlnasavo bhikkhu sahcicca panam 
jivita voropetum.
79 Cp., in this connection, the case, mentioned in Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Fan-wang- 
ching(T. 1813 (XL) 611 b 14—16; cp. T. 1804 (XL) 49a28-bl), of a mountain ascetic who in a 
neutral state of mind pushed a stone and happened to kill an ant, which was then reborn as a 
boar that in its turn happened to kick a stone which killed the ascetic.
80 This does not, of course, preclude concern for others from continuing after liberation.
81 A nice passage is found in Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Fan-wang-ching (T. 1813 (XL) 
609c25-26), where a sutra is quoted according to which the reason why a bodhisattva 
abstains from killing is that he has offered the gift of freedom from fear (i.e. abhaya-ddna) to 
all living beings, and where it is added that by killing he would offend against and compro­
mise this gift.
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altruistic goal and with believers’ expectation of protection and welfare in 
this world, there is a tendency to conceive of the Buddha (or of buddhas) as 
remaining alive for aeons. Thirdly, there is a tendency to conceive o f ulti­
mate welfare definitely as a blissful (and glorious, powerful) state. This 
means that the value of (ultimate) welfare in fact tends to be envisaged as a 
sublime continuation of life and happiness. What may, however, be more 
important in connection with animal ethics is not so much changes of 
aspects of the value “welfare” itself but rather a shift concerning the means 
by which one expects to attain it, especially (but not only) on the mundane 
level, purely religious elements like devotion and ritual tending, at least in 
some developments, to supersede ethics, especially animal ethics.
4. Let us now see whether the preceding assumptions can help to explain 
some of the features of Buddhist animal ethics.
a) Buddhist sources presuppose and sometimes expressly refer to a hierar­
chy of living beings,82 which also expresses itself in a gradation of the grav­
ity of killing. It is well known that according to the Patimokkha-sutta, the 
monastic code, killing a human being is a much more serious offence (one 
leading to expulsion from the Order: parajika no. 3) than killing an animal 
(which is merely an offence to be atoned: pacittiya no. 61). But the verdict 
of the Pdtimokkha is not, or at least not primarily, guided by purely ethical 
(or karmic) evaluations but rather by considerations concerning the internal 
harmony of the Order and its reputation in secular society.83 From this point 
of view, it is evident that keeping murderers within the Order would have 
brought the Order not only into disrepute but also into conflict with secular 
authorities. Abstaining from killing animals, on the other hand, was more a 
matter of ascetic purity than o f social concern, provided that no offence 
against property was involved (from this point of view, the incident which, 
according to the canonical commentary, occasioned the Pdtimokkha precept 
not to kill animals, viz. a monk shooting at crows, appears quite fitting). It 
would, however, be unwarranted to deduce from the comparatively lesser
82 E.g. in the context of the beneficial effect of gifts: MN III 1S5',AKBh 270,5-6 and 11-14. 
Cp. also Alan Sponberg in: T/W, pp. 351-376.
83 Cp. Heinz Bechert, “Die Gesetze des buddhistischen Sangha als indisches 
Rechtssystem,” in: B. Kolver (ed.), Recht, Staat imd Verwaltung im Klassischen Indien 
(Miinchen, 1996), p. 54; Oskar von Hiniiber, A Handbook o f Pali Literature (Berlin, New 
York: de Gruyter), § 13; cp. also Plants, pp. 16-17 n. 94.
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gravity assigned to the killing of animals in the monastic code that it was 
regarded as a petty offence also from a moral (karmic) or spiritual point of 
view, comparable, e.g., to expressly asking for delicious food on one’s alms- 
round84 (which may be spiritually detrimental but hardly a matter of karmic 
concern). From a karmic point of view, killing an animal is of course a vio­
lation of the first precept. In a Vinaya passage (197)—where it looks as if the 
third parajika, as an item of monastic law, was on the point of being sepa­
rated out from the older, ethico-ascetic precept not to kill any living 
beings85—animals are expressly included (see below: § 5.a); and when the 
suttantas contrast persons who keep the precept with those for whom break­
ing it is typical, the characterization of the latter as “cruel, with bloody 
hands, devoted to killing and striking, and merciless with regard to all crea­
tures” 86 clearly reminds one of the category of persons who torture others 
and do cruel jobs, among whom we find not only dacoits and executioners 
but also butchers, hunters and fishermen.87
84 Pacittiya 39.
85 Cp. von Hiniiber 1999 (see n. 77), pp. 41 ff.
86 MN 1286: luddo lohita-pani hata-pahate nivittho adayapanno (sabba-)panabhutesu', AN 
V 264; T. 99 (II) 271b20—22; cp. YBh 171,6-10; Siglinde Dietz, Fragmente des 
Dharmaskandha (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), p. 80,22-23.
87 MN I 343; 412; AN II 207.
88 macchikam maccha-bandhanv. the implication is that the person also kills fishes (AN-a 
III 351,5: macchikam maccha-ghatakam) and sells them.
89 Cp. T. 1509 (XXV) 192al6—17 (E. Lamotte, Le traite de la grande vertn de sagesse de 
Nagarjuna II [Louvain 1949], p. 1073): in Buddhism, friendliness towards all living beings 
prevents one from killing even an ant, how much less a human being.
90 The sentence may well be an addition whose purpose is to underscore the evil karmic
This does not, however, exclude that killing a human being was consid­
ered to have more serious, perhaps even much more serious, karmic conse­
quences than killing an animal. Actually, such a difference in gravity is, 
occasionally, also expressed in the Sutta-pitaka, e.g. AN  III 301-303, where 
it is stated that even a fisherman88 or a butcher who looks at the animals to 
be killed with an ill-disposed mind (i.e. with the resolve to kill them, and 
actually does so,) and sells them (or their meat) will not become wealthy, 
how much less a person (executioner?) who looks in such a way at a human 
being to be killed.89 The text adds that such a person will also go to hell after 
death, leaving the impression that this holds good only for the person who 
killed a human being, though this may not have been the intention of the 
author.90
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At any rate, the Theravada commentaries91 expressly state that killing a 
saint is worse than killing an ordinary person, and killing a human worse 
than killing an animal. The reason adduced is that ordinary persons have few 
and animals no qualities (guna). It is obvious that these qualities are spiritu­
al qualities, and in terms of the underlying value proposed in § 3 these spir­
itual qualities would have to be taken as actually or potentially enabling their 
owners to attain ultimate security (i.e. nirvana), which is inextricably linked 
to one’s own offering security to others and thus renders the life of such a 
person more precious fo r  others.91 The top position in the hierarchy o f  liv­
ing beings is, of course, occupied by the Buddha, because he offers security 
to others in a much wider sense on account of his having initiated and orga­
nized the preaching of the Dharma, and, on an even broader scale, because 
he came to be viewed as a supra-mundane protector and saviour. As for ordi­
nary human beings, their “qualities” probably consist in that they are, in 
contrast to animals, regarded as having at least the capacity for spiritual per­
fection conducive to ultimate welfare, and this is why human life is consid­
ered more valuable than animal life,93 the more so since being reborn as a 
human being is regarded as a rare chance difficult to attain.94 It is hence par­
ticularly harmful to deprive another living being prematurely of this rare 
opportunity. For the same reason, prematurely ending one’s own life by sui- 
result of murder, but not necessarily in an exclusive sense implying a denial of a similar 
karmic result in the case of habitual slaughtering of animals. Unfortunately, according to 
Akanuma’s Comparative Catalogue no Chinese parallel seems to be available.
91 MN-a 1 198; DN-a I 69; Atthasalim (ed. Edward Muller, London: PTS, 1897), p. 97. Cp. 
Keown 1995, pp. 96-99.
92 It is true that the idea that—besides killing one’s parents (which cannot of course be 
explained by the principle of spiritual worthiness but simply reflects the value pattern of sec­
ular society)—killing an arhat is the most serious and baneful form of killing (one of the 
anantaryas) may also be viewed as a kind of spiritualized remodelling of the Hindu idea that 
the most heinous form of killing is murdering a brahmin (an aspect to which my colleague 
Oskar von Hiniiber kindly draws my attention), but since in Buddhism the decisive point is 
spiritual superiority this would not invalidate the foregoing assumptions.
93 In the context of abstention from killing expressly so T. 1813 (XL) 61 la i 1-12: “From 
the point of view of [the result of] karmic maturation (i.e. rebirth in different forms of exis­
tence): [Killing of] a human being is grave, [killing of] an animal etc. is light, because [only] 
humans are, according to both Maha- and Hinayana, generally recipients of (i.e. qualified for) 
the Path.”
94 This idea is, however, not specifically Buddhist: Cp. Minoru Hara, “A Note on The 
Hindu Concept of Man,” Journal o f the Faculty o f Letters, The University o f  Tokyo, 
Aesthetics 11 (1986): 45-60.
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cide is considered detrimental,95 even though the karmic unwholesomeness 
of suicide (in contrast to the spiritual unwholesomeness of the psychic state 
by which it is normally motivated and accompanied) is a matter of dispute 
within the Buddhist tradition.96
95 For the special case of arhats see above § 4.c.
96 Cp. TSi 294C17-29 and 295bl5-22; cp. also T. 1509 (XXV) 149a5-9 and 154cl3-14 
(Lamotte, op. cit. [see n. 89], pp. 740-742 and 785), and T. 1813 (XL) 6 1 Ob 17—24: suicide in 
an evil mental state (hatred), suicide in a good mental state (disgust with one’s body, but at 
least for a bodhisattva still a defilement, sc. disorientation, though a very light one), and self- 
sacrifice for other living beings or for the Dharma (meritorious: see § III,4.b).
97 T. 1539 (XXVI) 588a21-26; Vi 184cl0-18; T. 1548 (XXVIII) 139al8-25; Tanjur (Peking 
ed.) vol. Tu: 278b7-279al; even more radical the Mahayana-Mahaparinirvana-sutra: T. 374 
(XII) 460b5—21 and 562b3-7 = T. 375 (XII) 702c9-25 and 808c8-ll;cp . S/M, pp. 211-213.
98 T. 1813 (XL) 61 la l3 —14.
99 This aspect is deliberately excluded by Yamamoto 1998, p. 166; implicitly also 1999, p. 
942.
100 See n. 91; cp. also Sp 864: mahantepana upakkama-mahatta akusala-mahattam hoti.
101 As against this, Tibetans, quite understandably from the perspective of the economic
The higher value of human life as compared with animal life has, howev­
er, not always been undisputed. In some non-Theravada Buddhist texts, we 
find a controversy on whether it is worse to kill an ant or a person who has 
entirely eradicated his spiritual potentiality (samucchinna-kusalamula). 
Some masters are, indeed, reported to assert that killing a human is always 
worse. Others, however, are said to have decided in favour of the ant 
because it is spiritually on a higher level, for as an animal it does not hold the 
wrong views which account for a radical eradication of spiritual potentiali­
ty.97 Similarly, Fa-tsang’s98 statement that to kill an animal that has pro­
duced bodhicitta is more serious than killing a human being with wrong 
views is likewise based on the principle that the value of a living being rises 
in accordance with its spiritual advancement. In this connection, one must 
not, of course, lose sight of the fact that in the traditional Buddhist world­
view the superiority of humans over animals is, as far as individuals are con­
cerned, only a synchronic one and does not, in a diachronic perspective, 
preclude their crossing the border-line in either direction by way of rebirth.99
Concerning the relative gravity of killing animals of different species, the 
above-mentioned Theravada sources100 regard killing a large animal to be 
worse than killing a small one101 because the former requires more exertion 
(payoga). This would seem to imply a firmer intention and a greater amount 
o f violence. Actually, a few lines further the same sources adduce the inten-
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sity of the evil motives and the degree of violence (upakkama) involved in 
order to decide relative gravity in cases where the size of the victim is the 
same. On the other hand, Richard Gombrich102 reports the opinion of a 
Ceylonese monk according to whom gravity is entirely dependent on the 
intention of the actor. In a non-Theravada source,103 this principle is even 
applicable to the relative gravity of killing a human being or an animal: 
Killing an insect or ant in a state of a violent outburst of mental defilement 
is more serious than killing a human being [in a mild state of mind, e.g. out 
of compassion]104. This looks very much like a pure ethics of intention or 
mental attitude, in which karmic gravity appears to be simply equated with 
spiritual gravity.
b) A crucial question in connection with animal ethics arises in cases where 
the precept not to kill would seem to come into conflict with the spirit of 
empathy and compassion, i.e. when an animal is hopelessly ill or injured and 
heavily suffering. According to oral information from M. Maithrimurthi, in 
the traditional Buddhist society of Sri Lanka, even killing an agonizing ani­
mal is (or was?) not considered appropriate. The reason is that any killing is 
considered wrong and that the animal, even if in a state of intense pain, still 
clings to life and resists being killed.105 Monks, on the other hand, would 
point out that the act of killing is always associated with hatred (or aggres­
siveness)106 and is hence unwholesome for the actor.
Unfortunately, textual material concerning this issue seems to be 
scarce,107 not only as regards animals but also with reference to killing a 
human being out of compassion. The Theravada Vinaya unambiguously 
states that even by recommending suicide to a sick person out of compas-
constraints of nomads, stress that it is less evil to kill one big animal than to kill many small 
ones. Cp., e.g., Marcy Vigoda, “Religious and Socio-Cultural Restraints on Environmental 
Degradation Among Tibetan Peoples—Myth or Reality?,” The Tibet Journal 14.4 (1989), p. 
29.
102 Precept and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 257.
103 ra '2 9 1 a ll-1 2 :
104 Cp. the ad sensum quotation of this *Tattvasiddhi passage at T. 1804 (XL) 49al2-13: ik 
delft,
105 Cp. Jataka VI 21 l,3f: n ’eva miga na-ppasu no pi gavo ayacanti attavadhaya keci.
106 This is the same position as in Sarvastivada Abhidharma (see below, with n. 120).
107 The issue need not have been perceived as a problem from the outset (perhaps the idea 
of killing an animal out of compassion was just out of the question), or may deliberately have 
been left in suspense.
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sion108 or by asking an executioner, obviously again out of compassion,109 
not to torture the sentenced person but to kill him with one blow,110 a monk 
commits the parajika offence of murder. But it should be kept in mind that 
judgements from the point of view of the Vinaya are valid for monks and 
nuns only, that they are guided not so much by moral or spiritual as by social 
considerations, and that for outsiders the motive of the monk may be 
unknown or doubtful. Apart from this, in the Vinaya of the Mahlsasakas 
killing out of compassion is expressly declared to be no offence.111
This reminds one of certain Mahayana texts according to which a bodhi­
sattva (who may be, of course, a layman and even a ksatriyaj is, in certain 
situations, allowed, nay recommended to kill out of compassion, but, as far 
as I can see, to do so only in order to prevent a human being from commit­
ting a heinous crime, i.e. in cases where the otherworldly welfare of that per­
son is seriously endangered.112 Therefore, these cases only prove that 
otherworldly welfare is a higher value than biological life. However, in the 
case of killing an intensely suffering living being (human or animal) out of 
sympathy because one cannot stand its suffering, it is only secular welfare 
that is at stake. According to a Chinese Mahayana text113 which deals with
108 Vin III 79; cp. T. 1813 (XL) 48c26-27 (a monk, seeing another person disgusted with life, 
provides him with an implement for [causing] his death; vaguely referring to T. 1425 (XXII) 
253c22-254al6, 254al7-bl0 or bl 1-25, and expressly interpreted by Tao-hstian as motivat­
ed by sympathy [T. 1804 (XL) 48c28; cp. also the commentary T. 1805 (XL) 259a20-21]).
109 Thus explicitly the parallel in the Vinaya of the Mahasanghikas (T. 1425 (XXII) 
256c20-22) and Tao-hsiian, T. 1804 (XL) 48c27-28.
110 Vin III 86; cp. T. 1425 (XXII) 256cl6-257a4.
111 T. 1421 (XXII) 9a9-10: “No offence, when in a mental attitude of compassion [or] with­
out the intention to kill” M$bL')- I was almost certainly wrong in refer­
ring, in BN § 51, this passage to killing an animal out of compassion, with the argument that 
animals are mentioned shortly before (9a8). As can be gleaned from a comparison with the 
final portions of the other parajikas, the structure of the text speaks against such an assump­
tion. In analogy to the treatment of the other parajikas, in the case of murder, too, a casuistic 
clarification with reference to monks (ending with the case of killing an animal) is followed 
by a sentence clarifying the gravity of the offence (i.e. of killing a human being) for nuns and, 
subsequently, for siksamanas and novices (for whom it is duskrta, but, in analogy to 5a27 and 
T. 1428 (xxii) 577b6, definitely one which leads to their dismissal), and the treatment con­
cludes with a remark on cases where no offence is incurred (by killing a human being, though, 
of course, a fortiori also by killing an animal)
112 Cp. L. Schmithausen, “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude towards War,” in: Violence 
Denied (see n. 74), p. 59; Kokan Fujita, “On the so-called ‘Taking Life’ in the Sllapatala of 
the Bodhisattva-bhumi" (in Japanese), in: Mikkyd Bunka 191 (1995): 152-136.
113 Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Fan-wang-ching: T. 1813 (XL) 61 lb 10—13.
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bodhisattva behaviour from the point o f view of both discipline and karma 
(i.e., roughly, ethics), such killing is, to be sure, formally a breach of the first 
grave bodhisattva precept, just as any other killing. But from the karmic 
point of view it is judged to be only a light offence because it arises from a 
wholesome state of mind. It is, nonetheless, karmically unwholesome. 
According to the Japanese commentator Gyonen (1240-1321)114,115 the 
state of mind it arises from merely somewhat resembles a wholesome state 
of mind, but the act that follows from it contradicts ethical principles. It is 
actually only the initial attitude that is compassionate and hence wholesome. 
But it is mixed with ignorance,14 516 and the act of killing itself is always com­
pleted in a mental state of hatred, albeit, in the present case, a faint one.117 
This explanation would seem to be in basic accordance with the doctrine of 
the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas who, basing themselves on a sutra,118 declare 
that killing is invariably initiated either by greed or by hatred or by (intel­
lectual) disorientation119 and invariably completed in a state of hatred 
(dvesa} or ill-will (vydpdda).'120
114 Hobogirin, Fasc. annexe (repr. Paris & Tokyo 1978), p. 253.
115 T. 2247 (LXII) 73c2-74al, esp. C17-21 and 25-26.
116 T. 2247 (LXII) 73014 = 7. 1805 (XL) 259al8-19.
117 7.2247 (LXII) 73c24-25.
118 SA 274b24-25, quoted AKBh 240,15 and Fz605cl-3.
119 AKBh 240,19-241,1; Vi 605c3-22.
120 AKBh 242,7-8. One would expect the cases of arhats killing themselves in order to 
avoid loss of their saintly status to be exceptions to this rule.
121 S/M, pp. 220-221; Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its 
Fundamentals and History, trsl. by Gyurme Dorje (Boston: Wisdom Publ., 1991) I, pp. 603 
and 767; Cathy Cantwell, “To Meditate upon Consciousness as vajra: Ritual ‘Killing and 
Liberation’ in the rNying-ma-pa Tradition,” in: H. Krasser et al. (eds.), Tibetan Studies 
(Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), p. 108 n.8; cp. also p. 107 n.3.
In some Tantric texts, however, the position of the above-mentioned affir­
mation of killing out of compassion is continued and explicitly extended 
also to animals. Yet, it has to be done in a ritual manner, and here too its pur­
pose is not so much the freeing of an animal from acute suffering but rather 
the animal’s liberation from its sad and spiritually unfavourable mode of 
existence, allowed only on the condition that the practitioner is capable of 
cancelling the bad karma of the victim and of advancing its spiritual 
progress.121 Hence, just as in the prophylactic killing of a malefactor, the 
engagement in violence and the infringement on the value of life—flawed 
though it is in the case of animals—are considered justified only by the pro-
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motion of the higher value of otherworldly or even ultimate welfare.
c) Another important issue in connection with animal ethics is meat eat­
in g )-2 To be sure, meat (including fish) is not normally available unless ani­
mals are killed, but the rule is not without exceptions if the meat of animals 
who died naturally is taken into account. Further, it would seem to make a 
difference if  the animal is killed by the person who wants to eat the meat or 
through his order or with his consent, or rather without his participation (e.g. 
by a beast of prey, or by professional hunters or butchers). In the latter case, 
there is no voluntary personal involvement in the killing on the part of the 
eater. For this reason, in early Buddhism even monks and nuns are, on prin­
ciple, allowed to eat meat if it is offered to them as almsfood. Yet, the 
Vtnaya[Ti adds that they must not accept the meat if they have seen, have 
heard or suspect that the animal has been slaughtered especially for them, 
which means that they should try to make sure that they are not even the 
involuntary cause of the slaughter. This may be a concession to Jaina criti­
cism, as the introductory story suggests. From a spiritual (and also a 
karmic) point of view it would be sufficient that the monk has not inten­
tionally contributed to the killing and that he partakes of the meat without 
greed and in an attitude of friendliness in order to protect himself from 
aggressive thoughts.12 324 By analogy, lay Buddhists have tended to buy pub­
licly available meat (and fish) from professional hunters, fishermen and 
butchers. Apart from special cases like King Asoka who must have been 
aware of his direct responsibility for the production and consumption of 
meat at his court, the mechanism of consumption stimulating the market is 
largely ignored in conservative Buddhism. It is only in one strand of
122 For a detailed treatment of the problem of meat eating in Buddhism I may refer to a sep­
arate study of mine under preparation. The most important scholarly contributions to this sub­
ject so far are Ludwig Alsdorf, Beitrage zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und 
Rinderverehrung (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1962); David Seyfort Ruegg, “Ahimsa and 
Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism,” in: Somaratna Balasooriya et al. (eds.), Buddhist 
Studies in honour ofWalpola Rahula (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980): 234-241; Masahiro 
Shimoda, “«Sanshu no joniku» saiko” (“On the Subject of ‘Trikoti-parisuddha-mamsa’”), 
Bukkyd Bunka 22 (1989): 1-21 (in Jap.); id., “Higashi-Ajia bukkyo no kairitsu no tokushoku: 
nikujiki kinshi no yurai o megutte” (“The Origin of Vegetarianism in the Buddhism of Far 
East Asia”), Toyo Gakujutsu Kenkyu 29.4 (1990): 98-110 (in Jap.); id., Nehan-gyd no kenkyu 
(A Study o f  the Mahaparinirvanasutra) (Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1997), pp. 388-419 (in Jap.).
123 Vin 1 238; cp. Il 197 and MN  I 369.
124 Cp. MN I 369 (Jivakasutta).
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Mahayana Buddhism that, in a changed cultural ambience, friendliness and 
compassion are used as an argument against meat eating and the argument 
that the buyer and the consumer are indirectly responsible for the killing is 
recognized.125
125 Lahkdvatarasutra, ed. Bunyiu Nanjio (repr. Kyoto: Otani Univ. Press, 1956), p. 252, 
15-253, 1.
126 Keown 1995, p. 48.
127 Pacittiya 20 and 62 (Vin IV 49 and 125).
128 Sp 786 and 865.
129 Sp 865: sappdnaka-bhavam natvd pi udaka-sannaya paribuhjitabbato pannatti-vajjata 
veditabba.
130 Cp. also I-ching, A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay 
Archipelago, transl. by J. Takakusu (repr. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966), pp. 30-33 
(see T. 2125 (liv) 208al3-b29; S/M, p. 187).
131 Valentina Rosen, Der Vinayavibhariga zum Bhiksupratimoksa der Sarvastivddins
5. a) At the beginning of this chapter (§ II.A. 1), I stated that the Buddhist 
precept not to kill living beings doubtlessly includes animals. Still, one may 
ask: to what extent? D. Keown126 suggests that tiny animals in the water may 
not be included because “it is unlikely that these tiny organisms would-be 
regarded by Buddhism as karmic life” , i.e., because they do not seem to 
belong to the “karmic community” . He thinks that the Patimokkha rule that 
monks must not consciously drink or spill water containing such minute ani­
mals127 128 is more a matter of decorum than of ethics. This may be true and is 
even supported by Buddhaghosa who classifies these rules as referring to 
offenses that are faults merely because the Buddha has stipulated them as 
such (pannatti-vajja).™  But Buddhaghosa adds that this is so because the 
monk, though aware of the fact that there are animalcules, partakes of the 
water with the idea that it is [just] water129 (i.e. he merely wants to drink 
water and is devoid of any intent to kill the tiny animals), thus tacitly admit­
ting that intentionally killing them would not be a matter o f mere protocol. 
Indeed, they are expressly called “tiny living beings” (panaka), this appel­
lation being a diminutive of the same word as that which denotes the living 
beings every Buddhist is expected not to kill. Still, the fact that there are sep­
arate rules prohibiting a monk from drinking or spilling water containing 
such tiny animals shows that these animalcules were a kind of border-line 
case. But monks were expected to be strict also in such border-line cases,130 
and occasionally we even hear of a pious layman (an army leader!) who car­
ried a strainer with him to avoid killing animalcules while drinking water.131
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Without doubt, modem knowledge about the presence of microscopic ani­
mals in any natural fresh water would have rendered a complete observation 
of the precept impossible, but the Buddha would probably have ignored the 
existence of such animals for the sake of practicability. But there can be lit­
tle doubt as regards insects. At I 97 (see above: § 4.a) it is explicitly stat­
ed that an ordained monk should not kill any living being even up to a tiny 
insect or ant (antamaso kuntha-kipillikam upadaya),132 and in the 
Sarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada133 canonical texts this expression is also 
used in the formulation of the precept for lay people.134 This suggests that 
the term “living beings” and the precept not to kill them was, in principle, 
understood to include all, at least all visible, animals. A t AN  V 289, scorpi­
ons and centipedes are even mentioned among the animals as which one 
may been reborn, and Af/V III 168 suggests the same for worms and m aggots.
b) Yet, it is true that, as far as lay people are concerned, the Pali canon is, in 
contrast to that of the (Mula-)Sarvastivadins,135 content with a general for­
mulation of the precept which does not contain the explicit inclusion o f even 
small ants into the category of living beings not to be killed.136 And (as
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1959), p. 120 (see T. 1435 (XXIII) 58a8-24; S/M, p. 189). This is 
a nice case of “qualified ahimsa” in accordance with the limits of practicability dictated by 
one’s “profession” (largely determined by one’s caste affiliation!); cp. the explicit recogni­
tion of such “qualified ahimsa” in Vyasa’s Bhasya on Yogasiitra 2.31. Cp. also the army 
leader (senapatil') Siha (Pm I 237; ANIV  187-188).
132 On kuntha-kipillika see Peter Ramers, Die “Drei Kapitel liber die Sittlichkeit” im 
Srdmanyaphala-sutra, PhD dissertation Bonn, 1996, pp. 46-48; von Hiniiber, op.cit. (see n. 
77), p. 46 n. 100.
133 The justification of this distinction has recently been questioned by Fumio Enomoto 
(IBK 47.1 (1998): 400-392). In the present context, it is used merely to point to different ver­
sions or recensions of the canonical texts.
134 E.g. Herbert Hartel, Karmavacana (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), p. 54; T. 26 (I) 
501bl5; Dietz (see n. 86), p. 80,23-24; YBh 172,4-5; cp. also Gilgit Manuscripts (ed. N. 
Dutt) III.2 (Srinagar, 1942), p. 43,12-13 (Civaravastu of the Mulasarvastivada-Vinaya). In 
the Chinese parallel of AN V 263—268 (no. 176: Gunda), contained in the Chinese 
Samyuktagama, the reference to ants is found in the formula of the unwholesome pattern (SA 
27lb20—23) but not in the formula of the wholesome pattern (27 lc22—24). In this tradition, 
the reference to ants is of course also found when the precept is formulated for monks or 
nuns: cp., e.g., Ramers, op.cit. (see n. 132), pp. 40-42 and 45 (with n. 37).
135 Cp. also T. 21 (I) 264b24f.
136 Reference to ants is also missing in the Dlrghagama of the Dharmaguptakas (T. 1 (I) 
83cl4—15 and 88c20) as well as in the separate translation T. 22 (I) 272cl 1-13, at
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already pointed out in § 4.a) when characterizing evil behaviour, the texts 
speak of people for whom killing is t y p i c a l , who have “bloody hands” 
and are cruel and devoid of mercy: obviously the same kind of people that 
are specified in another context as “professional” killers, including, among 
others, hunters, butchers and fishermen—occupations Buddhists were 
expected to avoid at all costs.138 Such a lack of explicit emphasis, in the case 
of lay people, of the fact that the precept actually extends to all animals 
could well have been intentional, with the aim of avoiding pressuring lay 
people beyond practicability.139 Thus, killing dangerous animals in self- 
defence or in order to protect one’s family or crops, or swatting bothersome 
insects, would certainly run counter to the precept, but the express stating of 
this in a way that would concern lay people seems to occur only in later 
sources.140 The explicit addition, in Sarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada 
canonical sources, that in the case of lay people, too, the precept holds good 
even with regard to small ants may indicate a tendency towards rigidity, per­
haps under the influence of a corresponding tendency in Brahminical circles, 
but for the time being this is a mere guess. The problem is that overtasking 
entails either inescapable feelings of guilt or the introduction of means of 
atonement or compensation. The danger is, on the one hand, that the avail­
ability of such means may undermine the binding force o f the precepts, and, 
on the other hand, that monastic institutions may exploit their privileged 
position to offer such means for their own profit. In addition, at least in pre­
dominantly Buddhist societies, the ostracizing of occupations connected 
with the killing of animals tends to entail the social discrimination of the
Ekottaragama (T. 125 (II)) 625b 15—18 and 756c28-29, and also at Dasabhumikasutra (ed. 
Johannes Rahder, Paris/Louvain, 1926) p. 23,7-9. (No attempt has been made to be exhaus­
tive.)
137 panatipatirr, for the function of the suffix °in, cp. Paul Thieme, Kleine Schriften II 
(Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1971), pp. 678-679.
138 This, and only this, would seem to have been the original aim of ostracizing these occu­
pations. The problem is that even in the pluralistic society of ancient India the rigidification 
of the caste system rendered it extremely difficult for members of the respective social groups 
to give up their inherited occupations unless they became ascetics (cp. Jataka VI 71-72; S/M, 
pp. 192).
139 This would, in a sense, agree with the Jodoshin position as characterized by Otani 1993, 
p. 26.
140 Vi 6 05cl4 -16; AKBh 240,21 (read atma-suhrt-paritrandya va) and 24 (read upaghataka 
or upatapaka). According to the *Tattvasiddhi (TSi 292a21-23 and 26-27) persons who kill 
noxious animals in order to help people earn, to be sure, “merit” from their help but at the 
same time accumulate bad karma from injuring the animals.
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respective groups,141 which is particularly unfair if for economic or social 
reasons a part of the society cannot avoid resorting to these occupations, and 
if their products are urgently needed or at least eagerly utilized by the 
rest.142
141 Cp. TSi 293c27-294a2.
142 This does not of course mean that everybody should join fishermen, butchers or hunters 
in killing animals in order to prevent himself from despising them. Nor does one have to con­
sume fish or meat in order to prevent these groups from becoming jobless (just as one would 
not feel obliged to drink alcohol merely in order to support breweries, or, for that matter, to 
become a criminal lest policemen lose their jobs). What is necessary is merely the sharing of 
the responsibility for the killing if one eats fish or meat, and the counteracting of arrogance if 
one does not.
143 For further details and references see S/M, pp. 195-201.
144 In Hindu sources, it is often precisely wanton or useless (vrtha) killing that is prohibit­
ed, but this is mostly defined as slaughtering animals (or eating their meat) outside the ritual 
(cp. Hara Minoru “A Note on ahimsa,” Journal o f the International College for 
Advanced Buddhist Studies 1 (1998), pp. 273-269 [in Japanese]). Hence, this prohibition 
may, to be sure, exclude useless killing, but at the same time it aims at providing a legitimiz­
ing framework for killing for the sake of food. There is nothing comparable in early 
Buddhism.
145 See Plants p. 75; cp. also Chinese sources like T. 1828 (XLII) 356b2-3: 
1829 (XLIII) 47a 10-11.
6. As for the actual everyday life in traditional Buddhist countries, I gather 
from observations and reports143 that the precept not to kill or injure animals 
is most effective in situations where human interests are not involved and 
where killing or injuring would be an act of mere wantonness.144 In propor­
tion to the duration and intensity of Buddhist influence, people may even 
accept some degree of inconvenience in order to avoid killing, though with 
considerable variation according to culture, social strata and individual 
character or religious engagement. But except for very pious persons, most 
lay people will tend to break the precept when their vital interests, or their 
very lives, are seriously jeopardized.
II. B. Plants and elements
1. As for ethics referring to individual plants or forms of the elements, the 
Indian Buddhist position is weaker than in the case of animals because, at 
least later on, plants and elements are expressly denied sentience, and 
destroying them is expressly declared not to be unwholesome karm a.145
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Nevertheless, monks and nuns are enjoined not to injure plants or dig in the 
earth.146 As I have tried to show in an earlier monograph, in earliest 
Buddhism, plants, at least, may still have been felt to be a kind of border-line 
case.147 Historically speaking, this attitude, replacing as it did the more 
archaic belief in the full sentience of plants, may have helped to reduce 
archaic inhibitions against the indiscriminate utilization of plants (especial­
ly against the felling of trees). Nowadays, some awareness of the mysterious 
nature of vegetable life, different, to be sure, from animals but clearly not the 
same as inorganic matter as well, may be worth reconsidering in order to 
counteract ruthless, wanton destruction of plant life, without, however, ren­
dering life entirely impracticable.
2. Wide-spread in traditional Buddhism is the belief that plants (especially 
large trees) as well as earth, lakes, rivers, etc., are inhabited by spirits or 
deities who might become irritated if their abode or domain is destroyed or 
polluted.148 This looks very much like a mere variant of the idea of the sen­
tience of plants, etc., and occasionally a tree is conceived of almost like the 
body of the spirit in that he will be killed if the tree is felled;149 but in most
146 Plants pp. 5-36; 46-51.
147 See Plants, esp. pp. 66-70.—Interesting in this context is perhaps the sequence of food 
in the mythic primeval period according to the Aggahhasutta (DN III 85-88): tasty earth 
(rasapathavi), bhumipappataka (a kind of mushroomf?], i.e. something growing but not 
green), a creeper (green plant), rice (seed); no meat, so far.
148 To confine myself to a haphazard selection of references and materials concerning 
Indian Buddhism: O. Viennot, Le culte de I ’arbre dans I'Inde ancienne (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1954), pp. 108-117; 124-125; Plants §§ 5.3-4 and 26.2; cp. also 
ibid. n. 201 (water deity); Okada Mamiko I8J ESSAW, “Ecoparadigm in Buddhist Narrative 
Literature: Plants and Trees and Ecoethics,” IBKA1.1 (1998): 285-281 (in Japanese); ibid. p. 
281 n.13 (ocean and river deities); SN III 250-253 (plant deities, cp. SN-a II 350 and T. 1464 
(XXIV) 879b29-c5); 254-257 (wind and cloud deities); IV 302 (plant deities); 
Pisuddhimagga, ed. Henry Clarke Warren & Dharmananda Kosambi (Cambridg, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1950) IX.69 (tree deity); T. 1435 (XXIII) 75a24 (tree, fountain and river 
deities, but also spirits of houses, roads, etc.); Lalitavistara, ed. S. Lefmann (Halle 
1902-1908), p. 319 (earth deity); T. 183 (III) 458bl5 (mountain and tree deities); 
Suvarnabhasottama-sutra (see n. 18), p. 163 (XII.55; cp. p. 115,9); Khuddakapatha- 
atthakathd p. 166 (spirits in the soil, in trees and creepers, and on mountains); Mahamayiiri, 
ed. Shuyo Takubo (Tokyo: Sankibo, 1972), p. 15,6-11 (yaks as inhabiting mountains, forests, 
rivers, ponds, etc., but also cross-roads, towns, etc.; for city gods (nagara-devata) in Indian 
Buddhist sources see T.H. Barrett, “Buddhism, Taoism and the Rise of the City Gods,” in: 
The Buddhist Forum 2 [1991], pp. 22-23). For the elements cp. also DA'II 259,15.
149 Jataka IV 153-157, esp. 154,5-6 and 156,1-2; see Plants, p. 15.
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cases150 the connection is less close,151 and the spirits have a certain inde­
pendence from their abodes and are usually considered to be capable of 
moving to another one.152 Utilization of plants and elements is then possible 
without killing, and permission can be asked for from, or even enforced 
upon, the spirit by appropriate rituals.153
150 The Buddhist tradition is normally fully aware of the difference between regarding 
plants themselves as sentient beings and considering them merely as inhabited by (mythic) 
sentient beings; cp. the analogous distinction of the belief that certain trees are themselves 
numinous (dibba) and the belief that they are merely inhabited by numinous beings 
(dibbadhivutthaf explicitly made at MN-a I 119,27-29.
151 In a sense, one might regard the structure of the belief in nature spirits as “mytho-eco- 
logical” insofar as smaller or larger parts of nature are envisaged as the “habitat” of mythic 
beings (just as they are the habitat of animals: cp. T. 1435 (XXIII) 75a23-26I). A respectful 
attitude and behaviour with regard to (parts of) nature under the influence of this belief could 
then be understood as a kind of traditional (mytho-)ecological ethics.
152 Plants, p. 74 with n. 416.
153 For examples see Plants, § 39.1.2 (cp. also Tokiya Koki SAAffi, “The Anityata-sutra 
Quoted in the Tibetan Version of a Mulasarvastivada Text,” IBK 34-1 [1985], p. 169 [in 
Jap.], and Gregory Schopen, “On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure: Monastic Funerals in 
the Mulasarvastivada-Vinaya,” Journal o f Indian Philosophy 20 [1992], p. 34). Ritually 
requesting/forcing the Earth Goddess to allow the use of a site for Vajrayana practice: Cathy 
Cantwell, “The Earth Ritual: Subjugation and Transformation of the Environment,” in: Eliot 
Sperling (ed.), Tibetan Studies; Proceedings o f the Eighth Seminar o f the International 
Association for Tibetan Studies (Bloomington, 1998), forthcoming. Cp. also Stephanie Kaza 
in: T/W, pp. 234, mentioning a ceremony for a tree that had to be taken down in an American 
Zen center (though without reference to a tree spirit and probably because the tree itself is 
regarded as a living being).
154 Cp. Divyavadana (ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1959), p. 122,24-25; Plants, pp. 60-61;
3. One might also argue that, consciously or unconsciously, a mental state 
of ill-will or aggressiveness is often involved when plants, especially large 
trees, or formations of the elements are destroyed, just as when one kills an 
animal (see § II.A.4.b). However, as a Buddhist one should not even 
become angry towards a burnt stump of a tree, still less so towards a sentient 
being, because this is spiritually unwholesome for the actor.154 Yet, the 
same would hold good with reference to artefacts as well.
III. Ecological ethics
0. As was stated above, ecological ethics is concerned with the value and 
preservation—be it for their own sake or for the sake of some other value—
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of species and biodiversity as well as of eco-systems or, nowadays,155 the 
global eco-system, but not with individual animals or plants unless they 
belong to an endangered species. What has aroused awareness of and con­
cern with ecological problems are not so much change, destruction and 
extinction as such; for just like individuals, eco-systems and species are— in 
agreement, by the way, with the Buddhist analysis of existence—subject to 
natural change and ultimately impermanent. The crucial point is rather the 
tremendous acceleration of these processes and their problematic direction 
as we face them nowadays on account of excessive human interference.
As is well known, there exists, among contemporary Buddhists, a strong 
movement, sometimes called “eco-Buddhism”, that stresses ecological 
ethics and corresponding activity as a central issue of Buddhism, and tends 
to understand the Buddhist tradition, or at least what is regarded as its gen­
uine strand, as having anticipated or at least prepared such a position. In my 
own study of the subject,1 5 6 1 have not found the historical situation to be so 
simple. Rather, I have come to the conclusion that the tradition comprises 
different strands, some of which are not favourable or are even counter-pro­
ductive from an ecological point of view, while others supply positive clues, 
albeit not a ready-made ecological ethics, not at any rate in early Buddhism 
and probably not in later Indian Buddhism either.
This has earned me the reproach of being reckoned, beside Ian Harris and
T. 1796 (XXXIX) 759a25-b6.
155 As for concern with global problems as a feature of modem thought (in contrast to a 
local perspective in traditional cultures), see Toni Huber & Poul Pedersen, “Meteorological 
knowledge and environmental ideas in traditional and modem societies: the case of Tibet,” 
The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 3.3 (1997): 577-598.
156 See, besides BN and EBT, my articles “Buddhismus und Natur,” in: Raimundo Panikkar 
and Walter Strolz (eds.), Die Verantwortung des Menschen fur eine bewohnbare Welt im 
Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus (Freiburg etc.: Herder, 1985): 100-133; 
“Buddhism and Ecological Responsibility,” in: Lawrence Surendra et al. (eds.), Stories they 
tell (Madras: Earthworm Books, 1996): 57-75 and 83-93 (full of awful printing mistakes 
[like p.69 “satiric” for “soteric” !], especially in the notes, because no proofs were sent to the 
author; reproduction of my contribution to the discussion unauthorized); “Heilsvermittelnde 
Aspekte der Natur im Buddhismus,” in: Gerhard Oberhammer, Marcus Schmucker (eds.), 
Raumzeitliche Vermittlung der Transzendenz (Wien, Osterreichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1999): 229-262; Maitrl and Magic: Aspects o f the Buddhist Attitude 
Toward the Dangerous in Nature (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1997).
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Hakamaya Noriaki, “among the strongest critics of ecoBuddhism” .157 I 
must confess I find this somewhat misleading. My criticism is not at all 
directed against eco-Buddhism itself as a creative response to the contem­
porary situation of the eco-crisis.158 What I have been criticizing is merely 
the way in which some eco-Buddhists not only make the textual tradition 
suit their point of view but (and this is the problem) do so with an express 
historical and philological claim, explicitly directed against the understand­
ing of modem Buddhologists and also that of traditional exegetes. This is of 
course legitimate, but it is equally legitimate for the philologist and histori­
an to rejoin if the argumentation fails to convince him/her. This does not, 
however, mean that time-bound beliefs or attitudes should be perpetuated in 
a fundamentalist way. It is vital for a living tradition to resort to creative 
thinking, either on traditional or on new tracks. But just as this fact has to be 
acknowledged by historians, creative thinkers should, to my mind, 
acknowledge the historian’s and philologist’s commitment to historical and 
philological objectivity (or rather the attempt to come as close to it as one 
can), regardless of personal predilections or expectations.159 I find it impor-
157 Donald K. Swearer in: T/W, p. 37.
158 Cp. EBT, p. 41, n. 23.
159 There is, to be sure, a constant danger that the personal commitment or bias of the 
researcher may influence his or her understanding or interpretation of the sources, and hence 
it is necessary that one makes one’s commitment explicit (as I believe to have done in my 
1985 article [see n. 156], p. 101, in BN §§ 1-5 and in EBT pp. 3-10). But I dare to doubt that, 
as Paul J. Griffiths asserts (see Jamie Hubbard & Paul L. Swanson [eds.], Priming the Bodhi 
Tree, Honululu: Univ, of Hawaii Press, 1997, pp. 438-439 n. 31; cp. ibid., pp. 157-162), 
such commitments must of necessity permeate one’s reading of the Buddhist tradition to the 
extent of inevitably preventing one from understanding what the authors actually meant. To 
a certain extent at least, this danger can be counteracted by deliberately watching out for evi­
dence that runs counter to one’s own commitments (and, what may be more dangerous, also 
for such evidence as runs counter to the position one has come to adopt and advocate as a 
scholar'). The tacit presupposition is, of course, that at least in the case of doctrinal texts, the 
authors had, as a rule, a tolerably clear idea in their minds (just as most of us would probably 
claim for ourselves), and that it is normally possible to retrieve this idea, at least approxi­
mately, by patient listening to the text, provided that the text is sufficiently explicit and/or 
sufficient background information available (cp. also Vetter 1991 [see n. 216], p. 179: 
“Inharent ist dieser Philologie die Zuversicht, dass der direkte Inhalt von Aussagen in der 
anderen . . . Sprache prinzipiell nicht jenseits unseres Begreifens liegt, dass er sich, von 
ungiinstigem Material abgesehen, griindlichem Nachdenken und Vergleichen langsam 
erschliesst,. . .”). If the hope and endeavour to come as close as possible to what the authors 
of the texts actually wanted to say (i.e. to understand them as they themselves wanted to be
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tant for both sides to understand and acknowledge each other’s motives and 
to discuss controversial issues in a matter-of-fact way.
In this sense, I should like to discuss, or re-discuss, a few points that 
caused me difficulties when reading the interesting essays in the volume 
Buddhism and Ecology recently edited by Tucker and Williams.
1. Some authors160 accord compassion a central function in connection with 
ecological ethics. But compassion or empathy normally161 refer to individ­
ual sentient beings (as does also the traditional precept not to kill living 
beings)162, and I can hardly imagine a species as such, and definitely not bio­
diversity, to be a sentient being. One may deplore the disappearance of 
species as a loss of natural beauty or o f human resources, but it does not 
seem to make sense to have compassion or empathy with a species as such, 
because a species as such does not feel pain and hence does not suffer from 
its becoming extinct. Nor is an eco-system as such, beyond the individual 
animals and perhaps plants populating it, normally understood as a sentient 
being on its own, except perhaps, in a sense (see below: 2.b), in some forms 
of Tantric and Far Eastern Buddhism (and, of course, in modem Gaia 
Buddhism)163, and even in these cases {Gaia Buddhism apart) the sentiment 
which caused people to refrain from destructive behaviour was hardly com­
passion but rather respect or awe. Anyway, unless species, or eco-systems, 
or the earth as a whole, are hypostatized as sentient living beings that are 
liable to suffer because of human mistreatment, it does not seem possible to 
simply jump from compassion to ecological ethics, as is often done, because 
the categories involved are fundamentally different.
This does not of course exclude that the two levels are, somehow, interre­
lated (see § 1.3). But their interrelatedness need not be a matter of awareness
understood) is positivism, okay, then I am a positivist, even if this is nowadays pratisro- 
togamin (and, for some, perhaps also *pratisrotragamiii).
160 E.g. Alan Sponberg (T/W, p. 367) and Malcolm David Eckel (T/W, pp. 342-344, in 
what is after all a remarkably thoughtful essay).
161 I disregard the threefold Mahayanist pattern of friendliness and compassion referring to 
living beings, dharmas and nothing (or tathata) because as far as I can see it was developed 
for an entirely different purpose (see above: n. 38).
162 It is only by way of a creative interpretation (the legitimacy of which I have no intention 
to question) that it can directly be extended to the environment or ecosystem and to species 
(as is done by John Daido Loori in: T/W, p. 179).
163 A suggestion in this direction is also found in Otani 1993, p. 28 (with n. 23).
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or interest. Thus, the compassionate or at least considerate behaviour of tra­
ditional Buddhists towards individual animals and to a certain extent also 
plants probably did have an ecologically beneficial effect. But this was 
largely a mere by-product, the express aim being, apart from one’s own 
spiritual perfection and welfare, the welfare of individuals as sentient beings 
regardless of their ecological significance. To be sure, occasionally the 
interrelatedness of the individual level and the ecological one is explicitly 
recognized, e.g. when the precept not to injure plants is accounted for by the 
fact that they are the abode of various insects and other animals.164 But even 
here the primary value at stake is the life or welfare of an assembly of indi­
vidual animals, not the preservation of species. Moreover, the interrelated­
ness of the two levels is an ambivalent one, allowing not only of coinciding 
but also of conflicting “interests”, and the ecological by-product of com­
passionate action may well be negative, as in the case of feeding stray cats 
in the vicinity of a bird sanctuary which provides refuge for endangered 
species, to choose a comparatively innocent example.
164 T. 1435 (XXIII) 75a23-26 and 1442 (XXIII) 776b 18—20; see Plants p. 12 with n. 62; cp. 
also ibid., p. 36 n. 204. Similar interpretations are given for the rule not to pollute water (see 
Plants § 11.1).
165 E.g. Ruben L.F. Habito (T/W, pp. 165-175; cp. p. 166-167: “. . . the three poisons of
greed, anger, and selfish ignorance, which the serious practitioner feels one must first battle 
with and attempt to uproot from within, before being able to address the issue of the toxic 
wastes ‘outside’.”); Buddhadasa according to Donald K. Swearer (T/W, pp. 27; 29-30: 
“When . . . this law of the very nature of things is firmly in our hearts and minds, then we will 
overcome selfishness and greed. By caring for this inner truth we are then able to truly care 
for nature.”); perhaps also Alan Sponberg (T/W, esp. p. 374: . . that meaningful change in
our environmental practice can come about only as part of a more comprehensive program of 
developing higher states of meditative awareness, along with the increased ethical sensibility 
which this evolution of consciousness entails.”).
2. Some papers of the volume explicitly or implicitly create the impression 
that care (or at least true care) for nature is possible only on an advanced 
level of spiritual perfection.165 To my mind, this view involves two prob­
lems: a practical one and a historical one.
a) The practical problem is that this view might be understood to imply that 
ecological ethics is accessible only to a spiritual elite. Supposing Buddhist 
spirituality or cultivation of the mind did result in ecological concern, this 
concern would surely be on a higher spiritual level (e.g. less self-centered,
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based on deeper insight) than in the case of an ordinary person. Yet, what is 
required is an ecological ethic for everybody, and especially for the unad­
vanced lay person; for in the field of ecology it is, after all, primarily lay 
people, and particularly businessmen, so important as adherents and sup­
porters of Buddhism from the outset,166 who actually decide the fate of 
nature. The situation is analogous to that of animal ethics: the precept or 
commitment not to kill animals has to be taken by every Buddhist from the 
outset, even though their compassion may still be on a low level, and 
notwithstanding the fact that their sensitivity will considerably increase as 
they advance on the Path.
166 Cp. Lewis Lancaster in: T/W, pp. 9-10; 12; 15.
167 Esp. Th 13; cp. Schmithausen 1999 (see n. 156), pp. 239-241.
168 Cp. also verses like Th 991 or the comm, on Th 110; cp. Schmithausen, op.cit., p. 241 n. 
42.
b) I must leave it to scholars of Far Eastern Buddhism to decide whether in 
some of its traditions awakening actually results in an increase of ecological 
awareness and commitment. As for Indian Buddhism, at any rate those 
forms I am tolerably familiar with, I have some reservations. One might 
adduce, in this connection, a few passages from the Theragathas, where the 
hermit declares that the natural surroundings fill him with delight.167 But it 
may well be that they fill him with delight because they are the surroundings 
in which he attained arhatship, so that it is not just the transient beauty of the 
natural surroundings but their spiritually helpful function that renders them 
truly delightful.168 This is not quite the same, but nevertheless imparts them 
a certain value to which an ecological concern might recur. Apart from this, 
as indicated before (§§ II.A.2.c-d), even an automatic outflow of compas­
sion arising from the liberating experience of truth or true reality seems to 
find little textual support before the introduction of the tathagatagarbha the­
ory, and I am not aware of any passage suggesting an automatic outflow of 
ecological concern.
I do not exclude the possibility of a creative re-interpretation of Yogacara 
or tathagatagarbha thought in an ecological sense, but, as far as I can see, 
the Indian sources of these movements do not reveal much concern for ecol­
ogy or a positive valuing of nature. Although the tathagatagarbha, latent or 
potential Buddhahood, is expressly stated to be present also in animals, it 
imparts value to them as sentient individuals only, not as animals, as mem-
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bers of this or that species. Rather, their animal body is compared with a foul 
and stinking garment!169
More promising from this point of view is perhaps the Tantric idea that 
certain mountainous areas are physical representations of the body or 
mandala of a Tantric deity,170 or the idea that the whole world is the body of 
the cosmic Buddha Vairocana.171 As regards the embodiment of a Tantric 
deity in a specific area, Toni Huber has shown in detail how in the case of 
Pure Crystal Mountain (dag-pa sel-rt) of Tsa-ri in south-eastern Tibet this 
idea involved a protection of the respective area from hunting and other 
exploitation.172 But he also draws attention to the important fact that what 
renders the area valuable is its “particular status as a divine embodiment” 
and not, as in modem ecological thought, the presence of certain species of 
animals or plants, or mere aesthetic beauty.173
As for the Vairocana cosmology, Klimkeit174 quotes a Turkish Buddhist 
text from Central Asia according to which the fact that earth, rivers, lakes, 
plants and animals are all replete with the essence of Vairocana entails that 
a monk who raises his hand against any of them sins against the Buddha
169 RGW I.118-120.
170 E.g. Ti-se, La-phyi and Tsa-ri in Tibet, regarded as mandalas of Cakrasamvara; cp. Toni 
Huber, The Cult o f Pure Crystal Mountain, New York-Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999; 
further references ibid., p. 234 n. 1.
171 Cp. Schmithausen 1999 (see n. 156), pp. 251-254; cp. also the Central Asian artistic rep­
resentations of Vairocana’s body covered with cosmic symbols: Paul Williams, Mahayana 
Buddhism (London & New York: Routledge, 1989) p. 137 (referring to S. Gaulier et al., 
Buddhism in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Leiden: Brill, 1976, pt. 1); Nobuyoshi Yamabe, 
“The Significance of the ‘Yogalehrbuch’ for the Investigation into the Origin of Chinese 
Meditation Texts,” Bukkyo Bunka (Buddhist Culture) 9 (1999), p. 25. Cp., however, the dif­
ferent interpretation of these Buddha images in Angela F. Howard, The Imagery o f  the 
Cosmological Buddha (Leiden 1986).
172 Toni Huber, “Traditional Environmental Protectionism in Tibet Reconsidered,” The 
Tibet Journal 16.3 (1991), pp. 70-72; The C ult... (see n. 170), pp. 197-99 and 208-09; but 
cp. also p. 218 (ecological and biological limits).
173 The Cidt... (see n. 170),pp. 199-200; T. Huber, “Overcoming Degradation?,” in: James 
Veitch (ed.), Can Humanity Survive? The World’s Religions and the Environment 
(Auckland: Awareness Book Company 1996), p. 32.
174 Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, “Apokryphe Evangelien in Zentral-und Ostasien”, in: A. van 
Tongerloo u. S. Giversen (Hrsg.), Manichean Studies I (Manichaica selecta: Studies present­
ed to Professor Julien Ries on the occasion of his seventieth birthday), Lovanii 1991, p. 158, 
referring to P. Zieme, “Uigurische Steuerbefreiungsurkunden fur buddhistische Kloster”, 
Altorientalische Forschungen 8 (1981), p. 242, n. 46.
62
SCHMITHAUSEN: BUDDHISM AND THE ETHICS OF NATURE
Vairocana. As against this, the Chinese Ch’an chronicle Ching te c h ’uan 
teng lu has the master Hui-chung (fit®) expressly reject practi­
cal consequences from the fact that the whole earth is the body of 
Vairocana.175 What would be required for the everyday practice of ordinary 
people is an intermediate position of respect towards nature within the lim­
its of practicability. Moreover, it is not easy to see how, if the whole world 
is the body of Vairocana, only nature would be sanctified thereby, and not 
also artefacts of all sorts.176
175 T. 2076 (li) 438bl2-14; cp. BNn. 141. Cp. Takasaki Jikido SBiWiSiM, “On the Concept 
of Non-sentient Beings Preaching the Dharma,” IBK 47.1 (1998): 1-11 (in Japanese), esp. 
pp. 7-8. In the English translation of Prof. Takasaki’s article presented at the Waseda sym­
posium the passage concerned is paraphrased as follows (p. 11): “The monk remarks that if 
the whole land were Buddha-body, our excrements would defile it. Is it not a sin? Huizhong 
replies that since all living beings are Buddha-body, then who could be held responsible for 
such a thing?” To be sure, the monk’s question aims at impracticable consequences, but Hui- 
chung’s answer would seem to hold good for any actions.
176 Cp. Schmithausen 1996 (see n. 156): 71-72.
177 E.g. T/W, pp. 29 (Donald K. Swearer, quoting or paraphrasing Buddhadasa: “ . . . the 
world is a mutual, interdependent, cooperative enterprise.. . . My own personal well-being is 
inextricably dependent on the well-being of everything and everyone else, and vice versa. . . . 
the interdependent co-arising nature of things (paticca samuppada)"}, 33 (“mutual interde­
pendence of all life forms”); 140 (Christopher Key Chapple: “interconnectedness of life”); 
295-296 (Rita M. Gross: “universal and all-pervasive interdependence,” “cosmic interde­
pendence,” etc.); 318 (Steven C. Rockefeller:” interdependence of humanity and nature,” 
“interconnectedness of all members of the larger community of life”); 342-343 (Malcolm 
David Eckel: “interdependent co-origination”); 353 (Alan Sponberg: “the distinctly 
Buddhist conception of the interrelatedness of all things”; cp. also pp. 368-374, arguing 
against reducing Buddhism to this “vertical” dimension .).
178 E.g. in the case of Gary Snyder; see David Landis Barnhill in: T/W, pp. 189-190.
3. According to almost all papers on Buddhism and ecology, ecological 
thought or ethics in Buddhism is based on the idea of universal or cosmic 
interconnectedness, interrelatedness or interdependence, and in this sense 
pratityasamutpada is often translated as “ interdependent co-origination” or 
the like.177 However, from an historical point of view, the indiscriminate 
attribution of this idea to “Buddhism” appears somewhat problematic.
a) Indeed, it occasionally becomes evident that the source of inspiration is, 
directly or indirectly, Hua-yen/Kegon philosophy.178 Yet, as far as I can see, 
in canonical (at any rate pre-Abhidharmic) Buddhism, no universal interde-
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pendence or mutual causality of everything with everything is expressed 
anywhere, and the rendering of pratityasamutpada by “interdependent co­
orig ination” is unjustified  here. In the central application o f 
pratityasamutpada, namely to explain suffering or the process of rebirth, 
mutual causality of members is exceptional.179 Especially in the case of the 
twelve-membered chain, attempts to interpret its original meaning in the 
sense of mutual causality or even conceptual interdependence are anachro­
nistic and incompatible with textual evidence, as I have tried to show on 
another occasion.180 18 To understand the expression pratltya as “ inter depen­
dent” is unwarranted and, as far as I know, not supported by traditional 
explanations. And although the ubiquitous rendering of samutpada as “co­
origination” is in accordance with some later commentarial explanations, it 
is by no means in accord with all of them (not even, e.g., the one given at the 
beginning of the Prasannapadd\'),'l3 i and hardly in accordance with the 
original purport, for in the twelve-membered chain, as well as in many other 
contexts, at least some items (like vedana or trsna) are not envisaged as 
clusters. Thus, sam- has more likely the function of indicating the comple­
tion of the action,182 183 as in sambodhi, which to my knowledge is not normal­
ly translated by “co-awakening” .
179 This is explicitly stated at YBh 230,4-15 (discussing the 10-membered formula), esp. 
12-13: “.. . as a means to show that in this single case [viz. vijhana and namarupa] there is 
mutual conditioning” (tatraikatranyonyapratyatva-samdarsana-taya). Cp. also Musashi 
Tachikawa, An Introduction to the Philosophy ofNagarjuna, Delhi, 1997, p. 117.
180 EBT pp. 52-55, ns. 65 and 67.
181 Cp. ibid. pp. 56-57, n. 73.
182 Louis Renou, Grammaire Sanskrite (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1975), p. 145.
183 Jeffrey D. Schoening, The Salistamba Sutra and Its Indian Commentaries (Wien: 
Arbeitskreis fur tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1995) II, p. 723; I 
prefer the reading anyonyapratyayo.
184 Ibid. I,p. 312.
185 Ibid. II, p. 422,2-3 and 8-10: rgyu gzhan dang gzhan las byung ba /  rkyen gzhan dang 
gzhan las byung ba (cp. also II, pp. 508,4 and 654,7). In the first occurrence of the expression, 
this seems to be the only rendering. It is only in the second occurrence that a divergent ren-
It was an interesting experience for me to hit upon a passage of the para- 
canonical Salistambasutra explicitly characterizing, in a resume, the 
twelve-membered pratityasamutpada as anyonyahetuka and anyonya- 
pratyaya.''33 Schoening184 translates this by “that arises from reciprocal 
causes [and] from reciprocal conditions” , but the Tibetan rendering has 
“arising from respectively different causes and conditions”,185 which is
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equally possible in Buddhist Sanskrit.186 Actually, in the preceding section 
of the text there is no reference at all to mutual causality, and even the 8th 
century commentator Kamalasila explains the expression to mean that there 
are many different causes, similar and dissimilar ones.187
b) The most important traditional applications of origination in dependence 
(I prefer this rendering of pratitya-samutpada) are enumerated in the 
Yogacarabhumi and the Abhidharmasamuccaya.^ But these sources would 
not appear to express the view that everything in the world, or for that m at­
ter in the universe, is conditioned by everything else in a significant way. 
The most interesting of these applications in the context of ecological ethics 
is no doubt the cosmogonical one, asserting as it does that the external world 
arises in dependence on the common karma of living beings.189 This view 
may not stem from the earliest period, but already in the Pali canon we 
encounter the idea that the external world is decisively influenced by the 
moral and spiritual behaviour of living beings or at least that of human 
beings, and that this influence has repercussions for the situation of human 
beings; e.g., moral misbehaviour of people may cause lack of rain, which in 
its turn causes famine.190 In the Aggahhasutta,m  too, it is greed and the 
greedy intake of food and other gradually increasing spiritual and moral
dering by gcig gi rgyu gcig /  gcig gi rkyen gcig corresponding to mutual causality is attested 
in the Them-spangs-ma-Aer'wsA editions (L, R, T).
186 See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1953), p. 42 (s.v. anyonya).
187 Schoening, op.cit. II, p. 508,4-5; “similar causes” refers to the fact that each factor is the 
effect of a preceding similar one, whereas “dissimilar causes” are the conditions mentioned 
in the twelve-membered chain: cp. ibid. I, p. 312, ns. 2 and 3.
188 YBh 203,7-11; AS 28,1-3; ASBh 35,1-13. Cp. also the *Adi-visesa-vibhaga-dharma- 
paryaya, T. 716 (XVI) 833c 18-834al3 and T. 717 (XVI) 841a3-25. These sources enumerate 
eight contexts of origination in dependence: arising of perception (vijnana), arising of crops 
(sasya), dying and rebirth (cyuty-upapatti), cosmogony (i.e. evolution and destruction of the 
outer world (bhdjana-loka)). subsistence of living beings on nutriment (ahara), karmic retri­
bution, arising of supernormal power (prabhava~), and spiritual purification (yyavadana, 
visuddhf).
189 ASBh 35,5-6: sarva-sattva-sadharana-karmadhipatyam pratitya mahdprthivy-ddlndm 
utpadat. Cp. YBh 30,21-22; AKBh 179,3 and 11-12; 192,3-5; Takasaki 1998 (see n. 175), p. 
2
190 /1AI 159-160.
191 DA no. 27, esp. Ill 85-92.
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misbehaviours that lead to a gradual deterioration not only of the bodies of 
human beings but also o f the external world, which in its turn exerts a cer­
tain feed-back on the bodies and behaviour of human beings. Though greed 
may indeed have a negative effect on nature in that it causes over-exploita­
tion, one should not overlook that in the above-mentioned texts the behav­
iour of people is not criticized from an ecological but from a moral or 
spiritual point of view, and that the causality considered to be at work is the 
karmic one, or at least one analogous to it. Moreover, the ideal state of the 
environment which is lost through this misbehaviour is not one of unim­
paired nature but is represented either as a highly civilized world, densely 
populated by human beings, or as one of primeval undifferentiatedness, 
somehow reminiscent of descriptions of transcendent final Nirvana, but cer­
tainly not of colourful biodiversity.
c) Another interesting idea in this connection is the occasional reference to 
the family relationship^92 of all living beings: It is difficult to find a living 
being who in the course of beginningless samsara has not formerly been 
one’s mother, father, brother, sister, son, or daughter. This idea lends itself 
to ethical consequences, but in the canonical text where it is found,193 it 
merely serves to illustrate the unfathomable beginninglessness of samsara 
and to arouse detachment. Apart from a somewhat doubtful passage in an 
Arameo-Iranian inscription of Asoka,194 it is only in later sources that ethi-
192 There are also passages that state karma-based mutual influence among living beings as 
a universal fact (Hakamaya Noriaki, “Viniscayasamgraham ni okeru araya-shiki no kitei,” 
Toyb-bunka Kenkyii-jo Kiyo.19 [1979], p. 37-38, § 5.b.3; AS 55,13-16 [unreliable recon­
struction; see Tanjur, Peking ed., vol. Li: 102b8— 103al]; ASBh 67,6-7; Vimsatika 
Vijhaptimatratasiddhi, ed. Sylvain Levi, Paris, 1925, verse 18ab), but not necessarily in the 
sense that every living being exerts such an influence on every other at all times. But cp. also 
below (§ d).
193 SN  II 189-190 (nos. 15.14-19), conesp. to SA 243a6-12 (sutra no. 952) and SA2 
488a26-b5 (sirtra no. 345); cp. YBh 198,4-6.
194 See Gikyo Ito, “Asokan Inscriptions, Laghman I and II,” in: Studia Iranica 8 (1979), pp. 
176 and 180-181: “ . . . Priyadarsi the King rejected (and) banished from the righteous the 
killing which discriminated against fishes (and) living beings, relatives (of human beings)”. 
The syntax of the line does not, however, seem to be unambiguous. Humbach (G. Djelani 
Davary & Helmut Humbach, Eine weitere aramaoiranische Inschrift der Periode des Asoka 
aus Afghanistan, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1974, pp. 11-13) translates “. . . Qualen von Fischen, 
Lebewesen, Verwandten . . . ” and suggests that the passage may be based on an original 
phrase similar to Rock Edict IV, describing the decrease of killing and injuring animals 
(panalambhe vihisa ca bhiitanam) and of improper treatment of relatives (natinam 
asampatipati) under Asoka’s rule. At any rate, Ito’s (op.cit., p. 177) reference to the idea that
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cal applications o f this idea of relationship to all living beings are found: in 
order to motivate friendliness towards them 195 and even in order to motivate 
abstention from meat eating.196 Yet, this is all ethics referring to individuals, 
not ecological ethics. It is not easy to see how this relationship argument 
could be used to impart value to other species as species or to biodiversity, 
unless it were creatively re-interpreted in the modem sense of the theory of 
descent.197
d) It may well be that in some later Indian theories some kind of universal 
interdependence came to be asserted, but it may be important to determine 
the precise import and intention. In Sarvastivada Abhidharma, e.g., the 
“cause in general” (karana-hetu) and the “influencing condition” (adhipati- 
pratyaya) of a given conditioned dharma are defined as all other dharmas 
with the exception of that dharma itself,198 but most of them are the cause or 
condition for that dharma merely in the very weak sense that they remain 
unobstructive in regard to its origination, regardless of whether they possess 
an obstructive capacity or not.199 This is clearly a minimalistic view of uni­
versal interdependence. But Vasubandhu200 also suggests a somewhat 
stronger one, in the sense that every dharma is at least indirectly (kramena), 
by mediation of a sequence of causes (kdrana-paramparayd), capable of 
contributing to the arising (utpatti) of any other conditioned dharma, even if 
it is never its direct condition. Thus, the unconditioned (and invisible) enti­
ty of nirvana may, indirectly, even become a condition for visual percep­
tion201 if the latter succeeds a mental cognition (manovijnana) for which 
nirvana had been the object-condition (alambana(-pratyaya)}. In this way, 
there is a kind of increasing diffusion of the conditional effectivity of a given 
factor in the course of time. Though the main aim of these texts is to explain
all sentient beings have inborn buddhahood is definitely anachronistic.
195 Visuddhimagga (see n. 148) IX.36; Sravakabhumi (see n. 35), p. 379,8-11.
196 Angulimallya-sutra, Kanjur (Peking), mDo, vol. Tsu: 204b 1 —3; T. 120 (II) 540c23-26 
(cp. Seyfort Ruegg [see n. 122], p. 236); Lahkavatarasutra (see n. 125), pp. 245,10-246,4.
197 Cp. Macy 1991 (see n. 208), p. 202. Duncan Ryuken Williams (T/W, p. 151) suggests 
the idea of a “deeper ecological self’ as a parallel.
198 E.g. AKBh 82,23-24; 100,11-12 and 15; Vi 103c25-27; cp. 104al6-18.
199 E.g. AKBh 82,24 (read utpadam praty avighna-bhavavasthanaf) and 83,2-7; Vi 
104c7-8; 105a2-6; AU 417bl6-18.
200 AKBh 83,11-15. As far as I can see at a superficial glance, this alternative does not seem 
to occur in “orthodox” Sarvastivada sources.
201 Ki AKBh 83,12, read caksur-vijhane instead of °nam.
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conditions and effects of spiritual practices and moral activities, the afore­
mentioned theories are formulated in a general way and hence valid within 
and with reference to the natural world as well.202
202 Cp. AKBh 83,1, referring to the sun preventing one from perceiving the stars (read 
suryaprabha ca jyotisam darsanasya, sc. vighnam).
203 From a very preliminary perspective, it would seem to me that mutual dependence in 
Madhyamaka arguments starts from related concepts like cause and effect and that the inter­
pretation of the mutual dependence of concepts in terms of ontological conditioning aims at 
de-establishing the (ultimate) reality of the entities envisaged by these concepts (cp. in this 
connection Claus Oetke, “Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Nagarjunas,” Studien 
zur Indologie und Iranistik 15 [1989]: 1-39, esp. pp. 10-15). I am not at all sure whether 
Madhyamikas would extend this analysis to the level of everyday experience, on which, after 
all, ethical as well as ecological behaviour takes place.
204 As for the Gandavyuha-siltra, see the important article by Phyllis Granoff, “Maitreya’s 
Jewelled World: Some Remarks on Gems and Visions in Buddhist Texts,” Journal o f Indian 
Philosophy 26 (1998): 347-371. According to Granoff (pp. 369-370), these “visions are not 
primarily proof texts for the unreality of the world, but examples of a transformed reality .. . 
brought about by a change in consciousness, . . . experiences of a higher, expanded reality.” 
This “transformed reality” seems to be a far cry from our natural world with its limitations 
and shortcomings, and it seems by no means clear whether (or to what extent) the latter is 
considered to participate in the interpenetrative structure of the former.
It would no doubt be appropriate to continue by discussing further 
Buddhist theories suggesting universal or large-scale interconnectedness, 
like mutual dependence in Madhyamaka,203 the visions of universal inter­
penetration in the Avatamsaka-sutra,204 or the interrelatedness of living 
beings and their worlds in the elaborate theories of the subconscious devel­
oped in Hsiian-tsang’s school of Yogacara/Fa-hsiang, and to try to ascertain 
to what extent, or whether at all, their genuine purport coincides with the 
interconnectedness of everything in the world with everything else as this 
idea is used in the ecological discourse. However, a satisfactory investiga­
tion of this exceeds the limits of time available for this paper.
e) Whatever the result would be, the traditional Buddhist emphasis on 
dependent origination and the acceptance of interdependent relationship 
wherever it presents itself would seem to make it easy for Buddhists to inte­
grate modem scientific insights into complex networks of mutual depen­
dence and interconnectedness. Still, this should not lead to a blurring of 
distinctions, for what is involved is not merely historical truthfulness but 
also spiritual or practical essentials.
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In this connection, too, the idea of the total interdependence of everything 
in the world or even in the universe with everything else strikes me as prob­
lematic. To be sure, the cultivation of this idea may be an excellent spiritual 
exercise, apt to support an attitude of universal transcending or widening of 
the self. But from the point of view of facts as well as practicability I have 
some doubts. I am far from calling into question the fact that changes at one 
place on the earth may produce far-reaching effects in other continents, and 
that large-scale cosmic events, or the collision with a sufficiently large 
meteor, may affect or even destroy the global eco-system. I agree that we 
should carefully consider the effects our actions may have on our neigh­
bourhood as well as on distant areas, and that we should not be unconcerned 
by events taking place far away. But does not the view that the slightest 
movement affects every comer of the world or universe exaggerate things, 
or at least render life entirely impracticable? Should we not take into account 
that minor, and still more so, major systems have a certain capacity for 
absoiption, so that our primary concern should merely be to know and 
respect the limits of this capacity? Does the neglect of these aspects not 
overburden the individual with an entirely unrealizable responsibility?205
205 Please excuse the example: Even if the theory that the farts of the ever growing number 
of cattle contribute to global wanning should prove to be correct: must I really be afraid of 
having contributed to the death of a penguin at the South Pole (or even on Sirius, if any exist 
there) if I happen to break wind?
206 T/W, p. 179. Cp. also Kenneth Kraft (T/W, p. 285), where the Platform Sutra o f  the 
Sixth Patriarch (“When others are in the wrong, I am partly responsible. . . . ”) is quoted in 
support of Loori’s position. But apart from the fact that the text of the apodosis is doubtful 
(variant: “I am not responsible”: cp. Philip B. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra o f  the Sixth 
Patriarch, New York & London: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967, pp. 18 and 161), I am not at all 
sure that the author of this saying was actually thinking of persons outside his immediate cir­
cle.
From a different angle, universal interconnectedness may be taken to 
entail that everyone is co-responsible for what anyone else is doing at the 
other end of the world. As John Daido Loori puts it: “And because someone 
in South America is doing it, that does not mean we are not responsible. We 
are responsible as if we are the ones clubbing an infant seal or burning a 
hectare of tropical forest.”206 But in such an unqualified form, we would all 
be hopelessly enmeshed in guilt. This would perhaps be in line with 
Shinran’s view but hardly with the tendency of earlier Buddhist traditions to 
keep ethical demands somehow within the limits of practicability. In fact,
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such a tendency is documented in some Sarvastivada texts207 precisely in 
connection with the problem of the ethical consequences of universal inter­
dependence: If  everything is a condition of everything else just by the mere 
fact that it does not prevent its coming about, would this not imply that just 
like the killer so also all other people would be guilty of killing since in a 
sense they had enabled this act by not preventing it? The answer is that one 
is guilty of killing only by actively contributing to the act (karaka-bhavena) 
and because one does so with evil thoughts. To be sure, this stance may not 
be entirely satisfactory, as it does not seem to include the responsibility of 
the one who did not prevent the killing although he was in a position to have 
done so. And in the modem context of ecological ethics, we would, e.g., 
have to stress the co-responsibility of the consumer. But apart from that, the 
aspect of practicability would seem to be reasonable in the case of ecologi­
cal ethics as well.
207 AKBh 83,9-11 (read anavaranabhavena cet sarva- [or: sarve] dharma hetavo bhavanti 
. . .); Vi 106c7-12.
208 See Joanna Macy, World as Lover, World as Self (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1991), p. 
185 (“joyful communion with all your fellow beings”); cp. pp. 193-205. For Snyder, see 
T/W, p. 187. Later on, he appears to have focussed, in a more practical perspective, on a 
regional community of all beings: see Charles R. Strain, “The Pacific Buddha’s Wild 
Practice: Gary Snyder’s Environmental Ethic,” in: Duncan Rytiken Williams and Christopher
5. Queen (eds.), American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship, 
Richmond Surrey: Curzon, 1999: 143-167, esp. pp. 152-154.
4. The mere interconnectedness of the world would anyway not be sufficient 
to motivate ecological ethics aiming at preserving, at a local or global level, 
humanity or life in general (threatened with extinction by human activities), 
or a certain state of the world including sufficient intact natural areas and 
biodiversity (equally threatened by human activities). Interconnectedness 
is, to be sure, the reason why damaging a part may affect other parts or even 
the whole, and possibly result in a lashing back at the damaging subject. But 
an ethical response to this presupposes that some value is threatened: either 
human existence or welfare, or the existence or welfare of all living beings, 
or of the world as a whole with all its biodiversity, appreciated as valuable. 
Eco-Buddhists like Joanna Macy or Gary Snyder are quite explicit in adopt­
ing the last possibility and take the whole eco-sphere of the planet as a com­
munity.208 Their position is emphatically world-affirming.
Macy even speaks of falling in love with the world, of the world as
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lover.209 And when she finds it necessary to expand the self so as to include 
all living beings or to experience the whole world as our body,210 this is not 
merely the traditional bodhisattva’s compassion for suffering fellow-beings, 
but an affirmation of the value of the world as an eco-system and of its bio­
diversity. This is very appealing but at variance with the predominant eval­
uation in at least Indian Buddhism which tends to view animals as unhappy 
and to imagine an ideal world as highly civilized and inhabited by many 
people but by few or no animals,211 and which sometimes even has the 
plants in ideal regions consist of jewels, so that there is no decomposition. 
But there is no reason why such time- or culture-bound ideas and ideals 
should not be exchanged for others in a completely different situation as 
ours, as seems to have also happened in the Far East.212 Still, there are two 
more points which seem to cause problems from an Indian Buddhist point of 
view.
209 Macy, op.cit., pp. 8-11 and 241. For similar ideas in Snyder see Strain, op.cit., pp. 
156-157.
210 Macy, op.cit., pp. 11; 184; 192.
211 Cp. EBT, pp. 24 and 28-29. As for a different strand, see ibid., pp. 26-27 and 31-32.— 
The question whether animal life (in the wild) is predominantly happy or unhappy is, of 
course, a serious one for ecological ethics. If the life of animals were in fact predominantly 
unhappy, the Buddhist ideal of a world without animals (not of course because they have been 
killed but because none are bom) could claim a higher ethical status than the argument for 
their presence just for the sake of human aesthetic demands or recreation.
212 Cp. Lewis Lancaster in: T/W, pp. 14-15; Schmithausen 1985 (see n. 156), p. 107.
213 Cp. Strain, op.cit. (see n. 208), p. 154: “Insecticides, totalitarian regimes, and nuclear 
weapons are part of the whole but in the manner of rogue elements.”
214 Macy, op.cit., p. 240; cp. ibid., p. 190.
215 In a comparatively early collection like the Atthakavagga, emphasis is no doubt on inner 
peace in this life, but even in such a text I fail to find a life- or world-affirming attitude (see 
n. 67).
a) One is the radical this-worldliness of this kind of eco-Buddhism which 
ascribes ultimate value to the world (as an intact213 eco-system). As a con­
sequence, Macy, e.g., emphatically rejects both the legitimacy and the pos­
sibility of escaping from the world. For her, the interpretation of Buddhism 
as aiming at liberation from mundane existence is a misunderstanding on the 
part o f Western scholars.214 But as a historian I can only state that at least for 
early monastic Buddhism, as reflected in the vast majority of the canonical 
as well as of later texts, precisely this was the ultimate goal.215 Why do per-
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sons who have just attained ar/ztztship rejoice in the statement that for them 
“birth is exhausted, the task fulfilled, no return to this world ahead”? And at 
least in Indian Mahayana—I am not concerned here with the Far East—, 
bodhisattvas remain in this world only in order to help others to attain liber­
ation, and not because they find the world nice, or attribute an absolute 
value to it.216
216 Vgl. auch Tilmann Vetter, “Zur religidsen Hermeneutik buddhistischer Texte,” in: 
Gerhard Oberhammer (ed.), Beitrage zur Hermeneutik indischer und abendlandischer 
Religionstraditionen (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), p. 189: 
“. . . der Grund dafiir ist aber nicht die Empfanglichkeit fur die wunderbaren 
Erscheinungsformen des Kosmos, sondem das Besorgtsein um die darin lebenden Wesen.”
217 Cited from D.L. Barnhill in: T/W, p. 188.
218 Ibid., p. 189.
219 Ibid., p. 190.
220 Ibid., pp. 196-197.
221 For texts, paintings and secondary literature see Dieter Schlingloff, Studies in the Ajanta 
Paintings, Delhi: Ajanta Publications 1987, pp. 123-129.
222 Cp. Schlingloff, op.cit. (see n. 221), pp. 145-146. Neither this story nor that of King Sibi
b) The second point is that affirmation of the natural world as it is implies 
affirmation o f its basic structures, among which the food  chain is the most 
scandalous one because it involves an awful amount of killing and pain. 
Joanna Macy is, as far as I remember, somewhat reticent in this regard, but 
Gary Snyder, consistent with his ecological approach, openly professes an 
affirmative valorization of the food chain, which he calls “the scary, beauti­
fu l  condition of the biosphere” .217 For him, the food chain is a “sacramental 
energy exchange” , “a giant act of love” .218 The food web is the communion 
of beings which constitutes the net of Indra which is made not of jewels but 
of flesh.219 Snyder refers to the Native American belief that the animal 
offers itself to the worthy hunter and does not mind being killed and eaten 
by him.220 21 Actually, in the Buddhist Jataka and. Avadana tales, similar ideas 
are occasionally found, as when in the Sasajataka222 the hare offers his own 
body to the ascetic because he has nothing else to give. I am not sure 
whether Snyder, or Native Americans for that matter, would also accept an 
inversion of the situation and offer themselves to a worthy grizzly, but at 
least in the Avadana literature even humans may offer their body to animals, 
as in the well-known story where the Bodhisattva as a prince sacrifices him­
self for a hungry tigress.222 However, in traditional Buddhism, not only self-
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sacrifice of humans for animals but also self-sacrifice of animals for humans 
is an exceptional, “un-natural” act of heroic self-denial. The usual evalua­
tion o f the food-chain is rather a negative one. The fact that the stronger eats 
the weaker is one of the reasons why animal existence is regarded as a bad 
form of existence full of suffering, and occasionally even serves to prove 
that animals are inferior also from a moral point of view.223 Monks are to 
contemplate food as repulsive, like the flesh of one’s own child, to be con­
sumed merely for the sake of keeping the body alive and fit for spiritual 
practice.224 This does not, however, imply any attribution of a positive value 
to the food chain but merely means one has to put up with it as inevitable. 
Even when, in what I call the “hermit strand” , uncultivated nature is appre­
ciated in its beauty, the food chain is almost invariably either simply 
ignored225 or suspended by a utopian peace in nature (even between prey 
and predator) under the spiritual influence of the hermit.226
5. After these critical considerations, the reader may ask what my own solu­
tion would be like. As a mere historian of Buddhist ideas who does not pre­
tend to be a Buddhist,227 1 may not be obliged or even entitled to offer any. 
After all, I have much sympathy with eco-Buddhism as a creative move­
ment. Yet, if a remark is expected after all, I might offer a few suggestions 
that might be acceptable to the tradition as well as practicable for ordinary 
lay Buddhists (and perhaps even non-Buddhists).
offering his flesh to a falcon (Schlingloff, op.cit., pp. 86-92) is found in the Theravada tra­
dition. This may mean that at least the abandoning of the soteriologically more precious 
human life for the soteriologically less valuable life of an animal was considered inappropri­
ate by this tradition. Cp. also I-ching’s remark {The Buddhist Religion [see n. 130], p. 198) 
that such self-sacrifice is not seemly for monks. On the other hand, he accepts it as an element 
of bodhisattva practice. Accordingly, it is expressly valorized as meritorious in Fa-tsang’s 
commentary on the Fan-wang-ching (T. 1813 (XL) 610b21 —24).
223 Cp., e.g., MN III 169; T. 26 (I) 761b21-25; SA 317cl2—15 (see Fumio Enomoto, A 
Comprehensive Study of the Chinese Samyuktagama, Pt. 1: *Samgitanipata, Kyoto: Kacho 
Junior College 1994, p. 37); T. 184 (III) 467bl8-23; YBh 87,13-14.
224 Cp., e.g., AN IV 49-50; SN II 98-99.
225 As, e.g., at Th 13.
226 Cp. EBT, p. 32; cp. also Monika Shee, tapas und tapasvin in den erzahlenden Partien 
des Mahabharata, Reinbek: Inge Wezler 1986, pp. 311 and314.
227 In the volume Buddhism into the Year 2000 (Bangkok: Dhammakaya Foundation 1994, 
p. 286) I have, it is true, been honoured by being appointed a Buddhist, but I had no chance 
to rectify the data.
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a) In one strand, at least, of traditional Buddhism, intact nature is an espe­
cially suitable place for meditation and spiritual self-perfection (though not 
the only possible one). A later Buddhist poem expresses this aptly by stat­
ing, in Hindu imagery, that the god Visnu created the Himalayan plateaus 
exactly for the solitude of holy men (vivekayaiva sadhundm)?-2* This con­
trasts nicely with the idea, found in other traditions, that animals and plants 
were created for utilization by man,28 29 or for sacrifice230. Nature may also 
offer particularly suitable objects of meditation, and thus, in a sense, act as 
a teacher.231 23 Thus, it would seem that Buddhists, and particularly bodhi­
sattvas,222 must not contribute to the destruction of natural areas but, nowa­
days, rather be active for the sake of their preservation or even restitution. 
Moreover, there is no reason why, in a secular frame of reference, scientif­
ic insight and a thorough reversal of prevalence in the relation between 
nature and civilization should not result in a revision of Buddhist concep­
tions about the ideal world; for though it would be unrealistic to ignore or 
even glorify the cruel and dangerous sides of nature,233 there would seem to 
be good reason to assume that nowadays preservation and restitution of nat­
ural eco-systems or such as are close to nature is helpful and perhaps even 
of vital importance for most, if not all, human beings, both from a viewpoint 
o f physical welfare as well as under social, aesthetic and psychological 
aspects.
b) Even if such an assumption should turn out to be unwarranted, the basic 
principles of Buddhist ethics concerning individuals would seem to suggest 
(if not necessitate) a proceeding beyond this essentially anthropocentric 
position. As was pointed out in § II.A.2, abstention from killing and injuring 
living beings as well as caring for their welfare holds good not only with 
regard to humans but also with regard to other living beings, especially ani­
mals. If in the case of humans this includes keeping their habitat in the con­
dition which is most suitable to their welfare, it is difficult to see why the 
same should not hold good for animals as well. According to the Golden
228 Meghajataka vs. 72, in: Michael Hahn, “Die Einladung der Pratyekabuddhas: 
Gopadattas Meghajataka,” Berliner Indologische Studien 9-10 (1996), pp. 172 and 192.
229 Cp., in this connection, the view criticized atAKBh 241,1.
230 Manusmrti V.39 (cp. Hara 1998 [see n. 144], p. 279). Cp. Ez 605c 12—14.
231 Cp., e.g., Takasaki 1998 (see n. 175).
232 Cp. Yamamoto 1999, pp. 947-946.
233 Cp. Lewis Lancaster in: T/W, pp. 10 and 14-15.
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Rule, just as oneself wants to live in a favourable surrounding, so do ani­
mals. In other words: for animals, too, living in a habitat most suitable for 
their welfare is a value which humans ought to respect just as they are oblig­
ed to respect their lives. This means that the precept should be understood as 
implying not only abstention from killing and injuring the very body o f ani­
mals but also abstention from destroying or polluting their habitats (which, 
after all, may entail their death).234 As was indicated above (§ III. 1), this idea 
is not alien to the tradition. And it is probably for the same reason that in his 
5th Pillar edict Asoka prohibits the burning of chaff with small animals in it 
and the unnecessary burning of forests. In positive terms, caring for the wel­
fare of living beings including animals would imply caring for their habitat. 
Though this argumentation envisages, in the first place, the welfare o f indi­
vidual beings, their requirements differ in accordance with species. Thus, we 
arrive at least at a “zoo-centric” ecological ethics, in which not only 
humans, but also animals (and, on the border-line or by way of deliberate 
extension, perhaps even plants) would be the points of reference.
234 Cp. also Keown 1995: 48-49. Cp. also the (modem?) idea of stealing the habitat of ani­
mals: BN § 47.1; John Daido Loori in: T/W, p. 179.—One might argue that from a karmic or 
spiritual point of view, the destruction of a habitat cannot be evaluated as an unwholesome 
action unless killing the animals inhabiting it is intended (or some other unwholesome state 
of mind involved). But then why are, already in the canonical texts, Buddhist lay followers 
prohibited from trading with meat, weapons or poison (AN III 208; Arthaviniscayasutra, ed. 
N.H. Santani, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1971, p. 40,10-12)? Clearly, the mer­
chant has no intention to contribute to the killing of animals or people and just wants to earn 
money. Yet, he of course knows that his business involves killing. Hence, in this connection 
we find a concept of responsibility that takes unintended but foreseeable damage into 
account. This is all the more remarkable in that it addresses lay Buddhists, especially busi­
nessmen. In the modem ecological context, even responsibility for unforeseeable damage due 
to carelessness would have to be included, and the prohibited kinds of trade ought to include, 
e.g., dealing with wood stemming from the indiscriminate cutting down of tropical forests, 
not to mention active participation in deforestation.
235 Cp. Yamamoto 1998,p. 165:“. . . environmental thought in Buddhism might b e ‘anthro- 
po-prioritism’ standing on ‘fundamental biospheric egalitarianism’ and ‘life-centrism’”. Cp. 
also Alan Sponberg in: T/W, pp. 351-376.
To be sure, there are many problems. One is that the ecological require­
ments or “interests” of different species may conflict, especially those of 
man along with his domestic animals on the one hand and those of such wild 
animals as require uncultivated eco-systems on the other. The traditional 
Buddhist hierarchy of living beings, to be sure, tends to privilege man,235
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but—though this appears difficult in the case of microbes and parasites for 
which man himself is both food and a kind of transient habitat—some solu­
tion or compromise will have to be sought, in a way similar to that required 
in traditional Buddhist ethics in the case of conflicts between human indi­
viduals and individual animals. One of the important issues in this context 
is, of course, the excessive growth of human populations.236 Though the 
normative Buddhist texts do not celebrate maximum reproduction, the mat­
ter is more complicated than it might seem at first glance, and cannot be dis­
cussed here.
236 Cp. Rita M. Gross in: T/W, pp. 291-311.
237 Yamamoto (1999, p. 943) pleads for an ethical precedence of the ecological perspective 
and of the aspect of avoiding cruel treatment of living beings over the traditional emphasis on 
avoiding single acts of killing individuals, and he thinks that killing for food is unavoidable 
and less grave, and may be compensated by “good” acts of protecting living beings. In prin­
ciple, this sounds reasonable for our present-day situation, but the idea of compensation must 
not be misused as an excuse for neglecting minimization of killing, or for ignoring the indi­
rect effects of one’s consumption habits (which may reinforce both killing and cruel treat­
ment of animals and ecological havoc). Not everything can be blamed upon the economic 
system; some renunciation may be inevitable for the sake of both animal ethics and ecologi­
cal ethics (cp. also Otani 1993, p. 29).
Another problem, already indicated in § III. 1, is that, mainly due to exces­
sive human interference, situations may arise in which ethics o f nature 
referring to individuals comes into conflict with ecological ethics, as in the 
case of the stray cats threatening endangered species in a bird sanctuary. In 
such cases, for me at least, it is difficult to imagine that a traditional 
Buddhist, for whom the precept not to kill a living being intentionally is pri­
mary, could opt for killing the cats in order to protect the birds.237 A 
Buddhist solution might be to catch the cats and bring them to an asylum. 
But it will not always be that easy.
Yet, as I said before, these are only a few modest suggestions from an his­
torian’s point of view. Buddhist thinkers are, of course, free to opt for more 
creative responses to contemporary problems. It is not my opinion that these 
two approaches are incompatible.
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Abbreviations
(For Pali texts, quotations are according to the Pali Text Society editions 
unless specified otherwise.)
-a = -atthakatha.
AKBh=Abhidharmakosabhasya o f Vasubandhu, ed. P[rahlad] Pradhan 
(Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1967).
AN = Anguttaranikdya.
AS=Abhidharmasamuccaya o f Asanga, ed. Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: 
Vishva—Bharati 1950).
ASBh=Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhasyam, ed. Nathmal Tatia (Patna 1976).
BN= Lambert Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature (Tokyo: The 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1991) [Studia Philologica 
Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series VII].
Dhp-Dhammapada (quoted acc. to verse number).
DN= Dighanikaya.
EBT = L. Schmithausen, “The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological 
Ethics”, 4 (1997): 1-74.
IBK= Indogaku Bukkydgaku Kenkyu (Journal o f Indian and Buddhist 
Studies).
JBE=Journal o f Buddhist Ethics.




NA = *Nyay anus dr ini of Sahghabhadra: T. 1562 (XXIX).
Otani 1993 = Otani Koshin “Bukkyo to shizen-hogo: shiron”
(“*Buddhism and the Preservation of Nature—a Preliminary Study”), 
in: Shukyd-teki shinri to gendai: Undo Gido kiju-kinen rombunshu 
(Religious Truth and the Present: Essays in Honor of the Seventy-sev­
enth Birthday of Professor Undo Gido), Tokyo: Kyoiku shincho sha 
1993:23-31.
Plants = Lambert Schmithausen, On the Problem o f the Sentience o f Plants 
in Earliest Buddhism (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist 
Studies 1991) [Stur/ztz Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series VI].
RGV= Ratnagotravibhaga Mahayanottaratantrasastra, ed. E.H. Johnston 
(Patna 1950).
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SA= Samyuktagama in Chinese: T. 99 (II).
SA2 = incomplete Samyuktagama in Chinese: T. 100 (II).
S/M = L. Schmithausen & M. Maithrimurthi, “Tier und Mensch im 
Buddhismus” , in: Paul Munch u. Rainer Walz (eds.), Here und 
Menschen (Paderborn: Schoningh 1998): 179-224.
Sn = Suttanipata (quoted ace. to verse number).
SN= Samyuttanikdya.
Sp = Samantapasadika (Vin-af
T. = Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, Tokyo 1924 ff.
Th = Theragatha (quoted acc. to verse number).
TSi=*Tattvasiddhi of Harivarman: T. 1646 (XXXII).
T/W = Mary Evelyn Tucker & Duncan Ryuken Williams, Buddhism and 
Ecology: The Interconnection o f  Dharma and Deeds (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1997).
Ud= Udana.
Uv= Udanavarga, ed. Franz Bernhard, vol. I (Gottingen 1965).
Vi= (Maha-)Vibhdsd(-sastra): T. 1545 (XXVII).
Vin = Vinayapitaka.
Yamamoto 1998 = Yamamoto Shuichi uLizM®—, “Contribution of Buddhism 
to Environmental Thoughts” , The Journal o f  Oriental Studies [Tokyo] 
8 (1998): 144-173.
Yamamoto 1999 = id., “Environmental Ethics and Issues in Buddhism”, 
IBK41.2  (1999): 947-941 (in Japanese).
YBh=The Yogacarabhumi o f  Acarya Asahga, ed. Vidhushekhara 
Bhattacharya (Calcutta 1957).
Addendum to § II.A.5.a (p. 52):
As for imperceptible animalcules in drinking water, cf. T. 1440 (XXIII) 
552b21 -25 where the Buddha is stated to have expressly confined the ani­
malcules which must not be contained in drinking water to those that can be 
perceived by normal eye-sight or are caught by straining the water, explic­
itly excepting those that are perceived only by the “divine eye.”
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